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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Mother, go back up into your quarters, and take up your own 
work, the loom and the distaff . . . speech will be the business of men, all 
men, and of me most of all; for mine is the power in this household.” 
~Telemachus to Penelope1 
“What we need is some old fashioned consciousness-raising about 
what we mean by the voice of authority and how we’ve come to construct 
it.” 
~ Mary Beard2 
Moot court exercises are as old as legal education itself. Oral 
argument of fictitious cases as a pedagogical tool seems to have originated 
in the English Inns of Court beginning in the sixteenth century.3 The 
earliest American law schools used moot-court exercises to teach both 
advocacy and substantive law, and Harvard—the first university school of 
law in the United States—continued that tradition.4 And much of the 
advice moot court provides on dress, demeanor, and delivery is older still, 
originating in the Classical rhetoric of ancient Greece and Rome.5 
Today, virtually every law school includes moot court in its 
curriculum, whether as a required first-year course, as an upper-division 
1. Mary Beard, The Public Voice of Women, 36 LONDON REV. OF BOOKS 1 (2014),
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n06/mary-beard/the-public-voice-of-women [http://perma.cc/3X3Q-
59SG] (citing HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, BOOK 1). 
2. Id. at 11. 
3. See Jeffrey D. Jackson & David R. Cleveland, Legal Writing: A History from the Colonial 
Era to the End of the Civil War, 19 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 191 (2014). See also JAMES DIMITRI, 
MELISSA GREIPP & SUSIE SALMON, THE MOOT COURT ADVISOR’S HANDBOOK: A GUIDE FOR LAW 
STUDENTS, FACULTY, AND PRACTITIONERS 5 (2015) (explaining the history of moot court). 
4. DIMITRI, GREIPP & SALMON, supra note 3, at 6. See also Jackson & Cleveland, supra note 
3, at 208-12 (discussing Harvard’s use of the moot-court model to supply practical legal and skills 
training). 
5. See Daphne O’Regan, Eying the Body to Find Truth: How Classical Rhetoric’s Rules for 
Demeanor Distort and Sustain Our Legal Regime, 37 PACE L. REV. 379 (2016). 
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elective, or as an extra-curricular activity.6 Not only is moot court a rite 
of passage for lawyers, it is also an invaluable pedagogical tool, helping 
law students to build skills in collaboration and teamwork, foster nimble 
thinking, develop professional identity, practice professionalism, exercise 
critical-thinking skills, and deepen learning in areas of substantive law.7 
But moot court has a dark side. Although well intentioned, the ways 
in which we traditionally coach oral argument, counsel students on 
general presentation and advocacy skills, prepare moot-court judges to 
assess arguments, provide feedback during competition rounds, and praise 
competition winners may reinforce and perpetuate biases that inhibit 
women from succeeding and advancing in, or even remaining in, the legal 
profession.8 By reinforcing longstanding and exclusionary stereotypes 
regarding the traits that make an effective advocate and the traits that 
make an effective lawyer, moot-court programs may inadvertently help 
cement the implicit bias that impedes greater diversity and equality of 
access in the legal profession. 
Little has changed in both moot court and the legal profession since 
Professor Mairi Morrison first attacked this issue over 20 years ago in her 
article, May It Please Whose Court?: How Moot Court Perpetuates 
Gender Bias in the “Real World” of Practice,9 and her advice on how to 
teach moot court from a feminist perspective still holds.10 In fact, most 
programs likely long ago implemented many of her suggestions, such as 
eradicating gender-based and racially-based language, striving to make 
judging panels more diverse, and including more diverse examples when 
highlighting great advocates.11 Yet, more than 20 years after Morrison’s 
article, moot-court faculty and students across the country still report 
instances of biased judging and feedback eerily similar to those Morrison 
detailed in 1995.12 And more than 20 years after Morrison’s article, the 
legal profession—particularly the highest-paying and most prestigious 
sectors of the legal profession—has made dismal progress in increasing 
6. See, e.g., A.B.A. National Appellate Advocacy Competition, U. OF ARIZONA JAMES E.
ROGERS COLLEGE OF LAW, https://law.arizona.edu/aba-national-appellate-advocacy-competition 
[http://perma.cc/ME2K-ZPCB] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).  
7. See DIMITRI, GREIPP & SALMON, supra note 3, at 8-17. 
8. These methods can have a similarly pernicious effect on students of color, students with
disabilities, students that are LGBTQ+, and students of non-Judeo-Christian religions, and that is a 
serious issue worthy of additional discussion in several additional articles. This Article, however, 
focuses primarily on the impact on women. 
9. Mairi N. Morrison, May It Please Whose Court?: How Moot Court Perpetuates Gender
Bias in the “Real World” of Practice, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 49 (1995). 
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See infra Part III.
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the numbers of women and other traditionally underrepresented groups. It 
seems, then, that more remains to be done. 
This Article suggests that many of the ways in which law schools 
teach students how to be effective advocates also reinforce a paradigm of 
the male as the archetypal “good lawyer,” and that paradigm, in turn, feeds 
the implicit bias that causes many of the inequalities and injustices in the 
legal profession. The Article then proposes some changes that moot-court 
programs and moot-court competitions can make to stop contributing to 
the problem. Part II briefly documents the continuing existence of bias 
and barriers to ascent in the legal profession. Part III discusses law 
schools’ longtime—and, at one time, entirely intentional—contributions 
to inequality in the legal profession. Part III also illuminates how some of 
the ways we teach, coach, and judge moot court—particularly those 
inspired by the values of Classical rhetoric—continue to privilege style 
and demeanor traditionally associated with males, and it illustrates this 
phenomenon both with examples from articles and texts about how to 
succeed in moot court and with testimony from the moot-court trenches. 
Part IV highlights two psychological theories—mindset theory and 
stereotype threat—and explores the ways in which those theories may 
illuminate challenges and opportunities for mitigating the impact of 
implicit bias. Part V highlights some of the barriers to change, and Part 
VI proposes concrete solutions to the problem, including teaching “critical 
moot court” to students, faculty, and volunteer judges to increase 
awareness of the implicit bias that underlies much of the conventional—
and Classical—wisdom about what makes a good advocate and a good 
lawyer. 
II. CONTINUING BARRIERS TO ASCENT IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION FOR
WOMEN AND OTHER NON-TRADITIONAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE
PROFESSION13 
A. 1995: Mairi Morrison’s Moot Court 
In 1995, Mairi Morrison published her article, May It Please Whose 
Court?: How Moot Court Perpetuates Gender Bias in the “Real World” 
13. This Article—like Morrison’s original piece—primarily focuses on issues facing women.
But this Article also seeks to highlight for further research and discussion the additional barriers and 
difficulties that women of color, women with disabilities, LGBTQ women, and women of non-Judeo-
Christian faiths face. The theory of intersectionality, first named by Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw, 
acknowledges that women of color confront additional and different biases and obstacles because 
they are both female and not white. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of 
4
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of Practice, identifying the problem of gender bias in moot court, tying it 
to gender bias in the profession, and proposing an agenda for reform.14 
Morrison—who was teaching first-year moot court and serving as faculty 
advisor for two moot-court teams at the time—began her piece with three 
“vignettes” illustrating the gender bias that permeated the moot-court 
experience in 1995 and teasing out the dilemma women face: to 
accommodate prejudice or to rail against it and suffer the consequences.15 
In the first vignette, a female student approaches Morrison regarding 
a rumor that women would be graded down for wearing pantsuits to moot-
court arguments.16 Although Morrison disabuses the student of that 
notion, she remains troubled by the highly gendered nature of law-school 
dress-code advice.17 In the second vignette, a judge at competition spends 
the post-argument feedback session providing comments about dress 
code, demeanor, and delivery directed “just to the girls,” including 
admonishing women that cocking their heads to one side—which some 
could interpret as a listening posture—was too “cutesy.”18 In the third 
vignette, Morrison watches as three highly capable but traditionally 
attractive and feminine female competitors are relegated to consolation 
prizes in a male-dominated Sports Law competition, whereas another 
team—”three pretty women from the South”—receive courtly treatment 
from male judges as the team advances through a Family Law 
competition.19 Morrison also cited similar examples from a study 
conducted by the Chicago Bar Association’s Alliance for Women, 
including one judge’s withering admonishment that “[t]his is not Gidget 
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and 
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; see also Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 
1244 (1991). Race “is not merely an added layer that makes them subject to additional challenges, 
but rather a component of their identity that intersects with gender to expose them to unique 
challenges.” Carla D. Pratt, Sisters in Law: Black Women Lawyers’ Struggle for Advancement, 2012 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1777, 1779. Gender and disability, gender and sexuality, gender and religion, 
gender and poverty, really gender and any of a variety of identities (or combinations of multiple 
identities) also intersect to create different challenges for different women. E.g., Kozue Kay Nagata, 
Gender and Disability in the Arab Region: The Challenges in the New Millennium, 14 ASIA PAC. 
DISABILITY REHAB. J. 10 (2003); Asma Lateef, Gender Inequality and Poverty, HUFFINGTON POST 
BLOG (Apr. 21, 2015, 12:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/asma-lateef/gender-inequality-
and-poverty_b_7099856.html [http://perma.cc/JR69-25BU]. This Article will touch briefly on the 
ways in which the male paradigm particularly excludes women of color, women with disabilities, and 
women with other intersecting identities. 
14. Morrison, supra note 9.
15. Id. at 58-66. 
16. Id. at 58-59. 
17. Id. at 59-60. 
18. Id. at 62-63. 
19. Id. at 64-65. 
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Goes to Law School.”20 In recounting these vignettes, Morrison 
highlighted the fine line female advocates had to walk in 1995: “distract” 
the court with reminders that you are a woman, and risk not being taken 
seriously; behave too much like a man, and risk alienating your audience 
by being “strident” or “bitchy.”21 
Morrison then analyzed the moot-court dilemma through the prism 
of three schools of feminism—first-stage/equal rights feminism, second-
stage/difference feminism, and third-stage/postmodern feminism, and 
identified the strengths and failings of each approach.22 The current 
approach to moot court, Morrison judged, followed the model of equality 
feminism in training women to be more like men and to suppress any 
“distracting” feminine traits.23 This model both reinforces the notion of 
feminine traits as non-lawyerly distractions and sets up women—who 
cannot, after all, be men, and who may not be able to calibrate their 
approximation of masculine behavior perfectly to suit every audience—
to fail.24 The difference model, instead, would value stereotypically 
female traits and mannerisms and therefore counsel women to embrace 
feminine dress, demeanor, and delivery to the extent that they were 
genuine.25 This model, Morrison noted, might disadvantage students 
when they enter the real world, where principled choices to defy 
stereotypes may have serious consequences.26 The postmodern model 
would challenge the very notion of gendered traits as detrimental to 
women working in traditionally masculine areas.27 Instead, in order to 
succeed, female advocates must adopt a sort of behavioral bilingualism, 
subverting the male paradigm from within by wearing its costumes and 
speaking with its voice, while simultaneously promoting more holistic and 
egalitarian values and beliefs.28 
Morrison ultimately advanced ten recommendations for reforming 
moot court and teaching it from a feminist perspective.29 Many of her 
recommendations were in the vein of teaching the controversy: exposing 
students to feminist jurisprudence; highlighting flaws in traditional, 
precedent-heavy reasoning and providing examples of successful 
20. Id. at 67. 
21. Id. at 59-60. 
22. Id. at 68-78. 
23. Id. at 73-74. 
24. Id. at 74. 
25. Id. at 74-75. 
26. Id. at 75. 
27. Id. at 75-77. 
28. Id. at 77-78. 
29. Id. at 81-83. 
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alternative techniques; explicitly recognizing the ethical issues involved 
in presenting an argument from a particular perspective;30 continuing to 
eradicate gender- and racially-biased language; and deliberate 
consciousness-raising about gender bias and how it affects all participants 
in the justice system.31 She also stressed the importance of diversity in 
judges, teachers, and models, posited that both male and female advocates 
should be taught to move smoothly between different argument styles, and 
urged deemphasizing stereotypical dress norms.32 Finally, she argued for 
improving the status of those who teach moot court, suggesting that 
providing such professors with security and academic freedom would 
better enable them to do the hard work that needed to be done in reforming 
moot court and, by extension, the legal profession itself.33 The suggestions 
I make in Section VI build on Professor Morrison’s suggestions, but they 
also move into new areas, providing targeted suggestions drawn from 
psychological research regarding fixed mindset theory and stereotype 
threat theory, as well as detailed, practical advice for those administering 
interscholastic moot-court competitions. 
B. Moot Court—and the Legal Profession—in the 21st Century 
Many moot-court programs have adopted a number of Morrison’s 
suggestions—selecting more diverse examples and role models, inviting 
more diverse judges, encouraging somewhat more diverse argument 
styles. In some ways, however, little has changed in moot court or the 
legal profession since 1995. Although certainly women and other 
historically marginalized groups have made significant inroads into the 
legal profession over the past few decades, white men still dominate the 
top tiers of the profession, and progress seems to have stagnated. “The 
ceiling may be shattered, but the pipeline to power remains elusive for 
most women.”34 Although women have made up more than 40% of law-
school graduates since the mid-1980s, as of 2004, women made up a mere 
30. This Article deliberately leaves aside some of the issues that Morrison raises about whether 
other values of law practice in the United States—heavy reliance on precedent, eschewing appeals to 
emotion or other values, the adversarial system, and others—affect the position of women in the legal 
profession. These issues are both fascinating and significant but are outside the intended scope of this 
Article. 
31. Morrison, supra note 9, at 81-83. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 83. 
34. Hannah Brenner & Renee Newman Knake, Gender and the Legal Profession’s Pipeline to 
Power, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1419, 1420 (2012). 
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15% of equity partners in law firms.35 As of 2015, women still comprise 
only 16.8% of equity partners.36 
Particularly where subjective decision-making comes into play, 
women—and women of color, in particular—still fare relatively poorly in 
the legal profession. Even where women ascend to equity partnership, law 
firms seem to value their work less than that of their male peers. Although 
women bill comparable hours to their male counterparts, female lawyers 
at big firms earn 32% of what their male peers earn.37 Even where women 
originate the same amount of business as their male counterparts, the men 
still earn more—sometimes a startling amount more.38 And billing rates, 
which are set by firm executive committees with input from the heads of 
offices and practice groups, further highlight this disparity in how firms 
value the work of female lawyers: firms bill out their female partners’ 
work at an average of $47 per hour less than they bill the work of 
equivalent male partners.39 Women seldom ascend to the ranks of the top 
billers.40 Ninety-six percent of AmLaw 100 firms report that their most 
highly compensated partner is male.41 Law firms seem to know that this 
is a problem; in the 2014 survey by the National Association of Women 
Lawyers, a significant majority of firms refused to report compensation 
data by gender.42 
This disparity is not isolated to big firms. As of 2012, only 27.1% of 
state and federal judges were women.43 Although women make up 66.2% 
of Assistant Deans, they comprise only 20.6% of Deans.44 Only 22.6% of 
general counsel at Fortune 500 companies are women.45 And the select 
circle of advocates who argue before the Supreme Court of the United 
States (SCOTUS)—arguably the Holy Grail of appellate-advocacy 
35. Julie Triedman, A Few Good Women, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (June 2015), at 39;
Stephanie A. Scharf, Roberta Liebenberg & Christine Amalfe, Report of the Eighth Annual NAWL 
National Survey on Retention and Promotion of Women in Law Firms, NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN 
LAWYERS 4 (Feb. 2014) [hereinafter NAWL]. 
36. Triedman, supra note 35. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. NAWL, supra note 35, at 11.
42. NAWL, supra note 35, at 4. Only 48 firms in the AmLaw 200 provided any data on
compensation of equity partners. Id. at 10. 
43. Dina Refki et al., Women in Federal and State-Level Judgeships, A REPORT BY THE CTR. 
FOR WOMEN IN GOV’T & CIVIL SOC’Y, ROCKEFELLER COLL. OF PUB. AFFAIRS & POL’Y, UNIV. AT 
ALBANY, STATE UNIV. OF N.Y. 1 (2012). 
44. A.B.A., COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE
LAW 4 (July 2014). 
45. Triedman, supra note 35. 
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competitions—is overwhelmingly male, even in 2016.46 In the last term, 
women lawyers argued only 23% of the cases that appeared before 
SCOTUS, which is actually an improvement over the recent average of 
18%.47 Of the 66 lawyers most likely to have their clients’ cases heard by 
SCOTUS—dubbed the “elite” lawyers in a recent Reuters investigation—
only eight are women.48 And of the 56 advocates invited by SCOTUS to 
present amicus arguments on behalf of parties who have declined to 
participate in the proceedings or are unable to retain counsel, only 10% 
were women; of these, all but one came after 2010.49 
The statistics are even bleaker for women of color. “There is little 
question that minority women—compared to white men, white women 
and minority men—face the most daunting obstacles to advancement in 
law firms.”50 Fifty percent of minority attorneys leave their law firms 
within the first three years, and 75% leave within the first four, whereas 
the overall attrition rate is 43% after three years and 55.6% after four.51 
Only 2% of equity partners are women of color.52 “Indeed, various reports 
over the past 10 years show that virtually no progress has been made by 
the nation’s largest firms in advancing minority partners and particularly 
minority women partners into the highest ranks of firms.”53 And of the 66 
“elite” Supreme Court lawyers, three are non-white.54 Only 5% of amicus 
invitations go to non-white lawyers.55 
46. Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Specialists, Mostly Male, Dominated Arguments This Term, 
NAT’L L.J. (May 11, 2016), http://www.law.com/supremecourtbrief/almID/1202757437432/ 
[http://perma.cc/8L5K-N4EU].  
47. Chris White, Lawyers Appointed to Argue Supreme Court Cases are Overwhelmingly
White Males, Study Finds, LAW NEWZ (May 16, 2016, 1:33 PM), 
http://lawnewz.com/uncategorized/lawyers-appointed-to-argue-supreme-court-cases-are-
overwhelming-white-males-study-finds/ [http://perma.cc/MP4U-6SFE].  
48. Joan Biskupic et al., At America’s Court of Last Resort, a Handful of Lawyers Now
Dominates the Docket, THOMSON REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2014, 10:30 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/ [http://perma.cc/5TLK-VBMF]. And of 
the 66, 51 work for big law firms of the type that routinely fail to value the contributions of female 
lawyers equally. Id.  
49. Katherine Shaw, Friends of the Court: Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Amicus Invitations, 
101 CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1583 (2016) (“The current approach permits the Justices to dole out the 
valuable asset of a Supreme Court argument to friends and former employees, in a way that is 
reminiscent of the cronyism and patronage that characterized government employment” before the 
Civil Service reforms of the 19th century.). 
50. NAWL, supra note 35, at 15. 
51. Luis J. Diaz & Patrick C. Dunican Jr., Ending the Revolving Door Syndrome in Law, 41
SETON HALL L. REV. 947, 949 (2011). 
52. NAWL, supra note 35, at 6. 
53. NAWL, supra note 35, at 16 (citing various studies conducted between 2004 and 2013). 
54. Biskupic et al., supra note 48. 
55. White, supra note 47.
9
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This problem is not limited to the legal profession, of course—
although half of the overall workforce is women, women make up only 
3.5% of corporate CEOs, 14% of executive managers, and 12.5% of 
corporate directors—but on average, women fare worse in the legal 
profession than they do in other sectors.56 
Although the reasons that people leave the legal profession or fail (or 
choose not) to reach its top echelons are complex,57 cognitive biases that 
reinforce pernicious stereotypes of women and of the traits that make a 
persuasive advocate or a good attorney contribute to the problem.58 
Despite progress—having three women on the Supreme Court of the 
United States at the same time is certainly an excellent start, for 
example—”inequities remain, often lurking in difficult-to-articulate 
domains of implicit bias and stereotyping.”59 
At minimum, gender stereotypes are “an important factor explaining 
the glass ceiling effect and the underrepresentation of women lawyers in 
prestigious segments of the legal profession.”60 Particularly where 
subjective decision-making comes into play—for example, compensation 
decisions, decisions about billable rates, and performance reviews—there 
is little question that stereotypes come into play. “Women do not share 
56. Ronit Dinovitzer & John Hagan, Hierarchical Structure and Gender Dissimilarity in
American Legal Labor Markets, 92 SOC. FORCES 929 (Mar. 2014). The legal profession itself recently 
acknowledged the pernicious persistence of bias in the profession. In August 2016, the American Bar 
Association formally adopted revised Resolution 109, which amends its Model Rule 8.4 to include 
discrimination or harassment on the basis of “race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, 
age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic status” in the definition of 
professional misconduct that will subject an attorney to discipline. A.B.A., Report to the House of 
Delegates, Res. 109 (Aug. 2016). The comments to the new Model Rule explicitly provide that it 
covers workplace discrimination and harassment. Id. In its report endorsing the adoption of 
Resolution 109, a coalition of A.B.A. commissions and committees that included the Commission on 
Women in the Profession noted that female lawyers report experiencing the effects of gender bias in 
their careers. Id.  
57. Commentators posit several factors that may contribute to this disparity. For example,
some argue that fewer women aspire to leadership positions than do men. This lack of aspiration, of 
course, may be the result of longstanding barriers to women’s advancement, such as lack of adequate 
child care options, lack of social and familial support, and the difficulties of advancing in a workplace 
permeated by gender bias, among other barriers. Others emphasize gender stereotypes in the 
workplace, which prevent women from “receiving the work opportunities that would allow them to 
showcase their skills and earn promotion.” Pratt, supra note 13, at 1778-79.  
58. Brenner & Knake, supra note 34, at 1423. 
59. Brenner & Knake, supra note 34, at 1424. 
60. Hannah Brenner & Renee Newman Knake, Rethinking Gender Equality in the Legal
Profession’s Pipeline to Power: A Study on Media Coverage of the Supreme Court Nominees (Phase 
I, The Introduction Week), 84 TEMP. L. REV. 325, 340 (2012) (citing Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and 
Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large 
Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2274 (2010)). 
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the presumption of competence held by men.”61 Assumptions that women 
lawyers will be less assertive, less committed to clients, less hard-
working, and less competitive lead reviewers and clients to latch onto 
objective facts that confirm those stereotypes rather than more numerous 
and significant facts that undermine them.62 
III. LAW SCHOOL’S CONTRIBUTION TO GENDER INEQUALITY
Although we cannot place responsibility for gender bias in the legal 
profession solely at the doorstep of law schools, law schools have long 
contributed to the problem. That law is an elitist profession is hardly a 
surprise to most, but it is also fair to say that U.S. university law schools 
were founded in part to exclude women and religious, ethnic, and racial 
minorities. At their beginnings, university law schools stood in contrast to 
the more democratic means of entering the profession: “reading the law,” 
which was the dominant mode of entry into the profession in the United 
States in the first half of the nineteenth century.63 When university-
affiliated law schools emerged later in the 1800s, they targeted a more 
affluent, upper-class audience, and they instituted mechanisms to exclude 
immigrants, members of racial, ethnic, or religious minorities, and 
women.64 When more accessible schools arose, providing legal-education 
opportunities for a more diverse population, products of the elite 
university schools decried graduates of those schools—primarily 
immigrants or members of minority groups or lower socioeconomic 
classes—as not just unqualified but unethical.65 
Although law schools are certainly less overt in these types of 
exclusionary tactics now, this inequality persists today, in the form of law-
school rankings, class rank, admissions tests that disfavor certain groups, 
values communicated by some law-school career offices, biases in faculty 
hiring, and a general disdain for any education that seems too practical.66 
And law schools continue to elevate the upper-class, Anglo, Protestant 
male ideal in a variety of ways,67 not least of all through moot court. 
61. Brenner & Knake, supra note 34, at 1423. 
62. Wald, supra note 60, at 2256, n.55 (citing A.B.A. COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE
PROFESSION, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA: WOMEN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 14 (2001)). 
63. Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools Reproduce 
Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1175-76 (2008).  
64. Id. at 1177. 
65. Id. at 1177-79.
66. Id. at 1202-07.
67. Id. at 1178-87, 1190, 1198, 1220. 
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A. Good Lawyers Look and Sound Like Men 
Moot court often is one of the first opportunities that law students 
have to experience what it feels like to act and sound like a lawyer. Most 
law schools include some sort of moot-court-type activity in the first year, 
whether it be just a small part of the first-year legal-writing curriculum, a 
full-blown moot-court class, or an intramural competition.68 
Much of what law schools teach about dress, demeanor, and delivery 
in moot court and other advocacy courses hearkens back to techniques of 
Classical rhetoric.69 And most of those techniques derive from the notion 
that the demeanor and delivery of the military leader or warrior—always 
a man—carries the most credibility and persuasive power.70 
This demeanor includes what modern advocacy experts style the 
“neutral stance”: feet approximately shoulder-width apart, hands at sides, 
with highly controlled, if any, gesturing.71 According to Aristotle, “a 
strong and manly posture derived from armed conflict or, at least, the 
gymnasium” (as opposed to the bent and servile posture more suited for 
slave labor) quite literally embodies rationality.72 Under the rules of 
Classical rhetoric, a credible, authoritative speaking voice is low, 
controlled, and resonant; a high voice, by contrast, signifies lack of 
emotional self-control, irrationality, and lack of authority.73 A speaker 
who shuns or is unable to emulate elite stance and delivery relegates 
himself to parity with “the insane, female, poor, children, slaves, the 
powerless”: in other words, the irrational and untrustworthy.74 
Female speech was considered inherently untrustworthy under the 
Classical paradigm.75 Women, ruled by their wombs and the hysteria 
68. See generally Standard 305(a), A.B.A. Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of
Law Schools 18 (2015).  
69. See generally O’Regan, supra note 5. 
70. Id. at 387 (“The dominant elite tradition successfully imposed aristocratic, upper-class 
demeanor, including the physical habits of wealthy foot soldiers, as natural and linked to rationality 
and truth.”). 
71. Id. at 388 (citing Leonard Matheo & Lisa DeCaro, The Eleven Most Frequently Asked
Questions about Courtroom Presentation and Performance, THE PRACTICAL LITIGATOR 17, 30 (Sept. 
1999)). 
72. O’Regan, supra note 5, at 393. 
73. Id. at 403, n.120-22. 
74. Id. at 399 (citing Joy Connolly, The Politics of Rhetorical Education, in CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO ANCIENT RHETORIC 135 (Erik Gunderson ed., 2009)) (“Cicero and Quintilian are 
policeman of behavior and style, encouraging students to cultivate a ‘naturally’ masculine attitude, 
and punishing those who had the look and sounds of the slave, the foreigner, the ill-educated man, or 
the woman.”). 
75. O’Regan, supra note 5, at 401, n.104. 
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those organs caused, spoke from untrustworthy motives.76 And speech 
that mirrored women’s speech—particularly “shrill” or “shrieking” tones 
reflecting lack of emotional control—conveyed a speaker’s lack of 
credibility.77 
In fact, the very notion of a woman speaking in the public sphere—
much less on issues relating to law or politics—violated the Classical 
social code. As Classicist Mary Beard notes, “public speaking and oratory 
were not merely things that ancient women didn’t do: they were exclusive 
practices and skills that defined masculinity as a gender.”78 In the 
Classical view, women could not adapt their private speech—largely 
focused on domestic matters—to the “lofty idiom” of law and politics.79 
When a woman did insert herself into the public forum, she could be seen 
two ways: as an “androgyne,” hiding a “man’s nature” behind her 
woman’s form, or as an “unnatural freak,” irritating her audience with her 
“impudent” “yapping.”80 As Beard observes, a “woman speaking in 
public was, in most circumstances, by definition not a woman.”81 To the 
extent that the rare woman could be accepted as a speaker in the public 
sphere, her role and subject matter were limited: she could speak on her 
own behalf as a victim, or she could speak to defend her home and 
family.82 She could not speak for men.83 
The goal of the elite speaker was invisibility: “The speakers who are 
within the elite norm disappear; they leave behind what looks like 
disembodied speech.”84 Deviations from this elite norm distract from the 
message. And women and members of other non-elite groups have less 
freedom to deviate.85 
B. To Be or Not to Be . . . Feminine? 
According to conventional wisdom, appellate argument of the type 
practiced in most moot-court competitions calls for the elite dress, 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Beard, supra note 1.
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. O’Regan, supra note 5, at 416. 
85. Id. at 419, 427, 429 (“By making the wrong gesture, the advocate slips backward into the 
non-legal world, of the body, deception, particularity, emotionality, irrationality, and finally, insanity. 
This is a particular danger for women and other non-elite groups. Their precarious position requires 
them to be constantly vigilant in the presentation of a rational, elite self.”). 
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demeanor, and delivery of the warrior rhetorician.86 And, as modern 
moot-court wisdom would have it, the voice of authority is still a deep and 
resonant one. No lesser authorities than U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Antonin Scalia and noted legal-writing expert Bryan Garner advise 
advocates to spend time on efforts to lower their vocal pitch, opining that 
“a high and shrill tone does not inspire confidence.”87 Scalia and Garner 
hardly stand alone; advice about lowering vocal register pervades books 
and articles on effective oral advocacy.88 Even those oral-advocacy 
experts who explicitly acknowledge the sexism that may underlie the 
connection between low voices and authority nonetheless counsel 
advocates to speak in the lower end of their vocal range. Alan Dworsky, 
for example, in his excellent The Little Book on Oral Argument, counsels: 
“Speak at a pitch in the lower end of your range. If sexism is the cause of 
the general perception that low voices have more authority than high 
voices, then perhaps as women occupy more positions of power this rule 
will change.”89 And many of the texts warn of the consequences of a 
86. Id. at 422. This Article deliberately leaves aside the question of whether the focus on
appellate advocacy—which dominates the world of legal-skills competition and even the curriculum 
of first-year legal writing programs—exacerbates the problem. See LEGAL WRITING INST., ASS’N OF 
LEGAL WRITING DIRS., REPORT OF THE ANNUAL LEGAL WRITING SURVEY 13 (2014) (demonstrating 
that out of 176 schools reporting, 125 taught appellate argument, compared with 84 that taught 
pretrial-motion argument and 45 that taught trial-motion argument, and no school taught trial 
advocacy in the first year).  
87. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING 
JUDGES 143 (West Publishing Co. 2008). 
88. See, e.g., CELIA W. CHILDRESS, PERSUASIVE DELIVERY IN THE COURTROOM 320 (Lawyers 
Cooperative Pub. 1995) (quoted in BRYAN GARNER, THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT: ENDURING 
PRINCIPLES WITH SUPPORTING COMMENTS FROM THE LITERATURE 21 (Thomson/West 2009)) 
[hereinafter THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT] (“There is no doubt that people prefer to listen to low-
pitched voices and ascribe stronger personality qualities to the low-pitched speaker.”); IAIN MORLEY, 
THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE: A SHORT POLEMIC ON HOW TO BE SERIOUSLY GOOD IN COURT 46 (2005) 
(quoted in THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT, at 21) (“Deeper voices sound more persuasive—why is 
a mystery, but they just do.”); Michael J. Higdon, Oral Argument and Impression Management: 
Harnessing the Power of Nonverbal Persuasion for a Judicial Audience, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 631, 
652 (2009) [hereinafter Oral Argument and Impression Management] (asserting that a deeper pitch is 
both more persuasive and more credible).  
89. ALAN L. DWORSKY, THE LITTLE BOOK ON ORAL ARGUMENT 43 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 
1991). There is ample research suggesting that most people find deeper voices more credible and 
persuasive, and it could be a result of evolution. For example, one study found that women who use 
a sultry voice are better at persuading people than women with high-pitched voices. Cheng et al., 
Listen, Follow Me: Dynamic Vocal Signals of Dominance Predict Emergent Social Rank in Humans, 
145(5) J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 536 (May 2016) (“[We] found that when the voice . . . goes 
down in pitch, people judge the person as wanting to be more influential, more powerful, more 
intimidating or more domineering . . . . Our study adds to the evidence that humans, like many other 
animals, use their voices to signal and assert dominance over others.”); How to Use Voice Pitch to 
Influence Others in Seconds, PSYBLOG (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.spring.org.uk/2016/04/how-to-
use-voice-pitch-to-influence-others-in-seconds.php [http://perma.cc/RY2F-W6RB]. Another study 
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higher pitch, which range from simply being annoying to being less 
persuasive and less credible.90 
Women must walk a particularly fine vocal line: Their voices, like 
men’s, must be “low in pitch, loud and resonant,” and “certainly a few 
notes lower in register than the ordinary female voice,” but still “all 
feminine.”91 The recent handwringing in the popular media and elsewhere 
about so-called “vocal fry”—which “occurs typically when speakers 
lower their vocal pitch to the lowest register they are capable of 
producing”92—illustrates the confounding contours of this advice: women 
who lower their voices too unnaturally, or who lower their voices 
irregularly or for emphasis, may be perceived as even less professional, 
credible, and persuasive than those who do not lower their voices at all, 
conducted by Meghan Sumner, Associate Professor of Linguistics at Stanford, showed how people 
preferred male voices when compared to female voices, even when the female voices were deemed 
trustworthy and the male voices, on their own, were deemed unreliable or unintelligent. See Vivian 
Giang, How Unconscious Bias is Affecting Our Ability to Listen, FAST COMPANY (Sept. 8, 2016, 5:04 
AM), https://www.fastcompany.com/3063218/how-unconscious-bias-is-affecting-our-ability-to-
listen [http://perma.cc/CVJ4-HHEJ] (discussing Professor Sumner’s findings). Of course, this 
unconscious bias may only be reinforced in law schools. But, as Professor Jennifer Romig points out, 
by acknowledging that we have subconscious stereotypes, we may start to change them, especially in 
the legal profession.  
[One] overarching fundamental legal skill is the ability to effectively assess and respond 
to the perspective of the recipient of the communication. This requires inclusive listening. 
Inclusive listening makes other people feel valued and understood. When listening to oth-
ers most of us tend to assume we understand and we reach conclusions based on our point 
of view and our implicit biases. Inclusive listening doesn’t make assumptions. It requires 
one to actively engage in critical thinking: notice and question our assumptions, and rec-
ognize that assumptions are not truths. 
Jennifer Romig, Inclusive Listening: Pushing Through Bias and Assumptions, LISTEN LIKE A 
LAWYER (Oct. 3, 2016), https://listenlikealawyer.com/2016/10/03/inclusive-listening-pushing-
through-bias-and-assumptions/ [http://perma.cc/R8BS-RAE4]. 
90. See, e.g., Hon. Yvonne Kauger (as quoted in RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL 
325 (1992)) (“Don’t whine. This applies to both sexes . . . . Take a deep breath and lower your 
register.”); CHILDRESS, supra note 88, at 346 (quoted in THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT, supra note 
88, at 21) (“High-pitched voices irritate more people than you can imagine.”); Jean Johnson 
Spearman, General Communication Skills, in MASTER ADVOCATES’ HANDBOOK 285, 297 (D. Lake 
Rumsey ed., 1986) (“Some voices are naturally higher pitched than others. If the voice is too high and 
lacks variety, it can become annoying to your audience.”); MORLEY, supra note 88, at 46 (quoted in 
THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT, supra note 88, at 21) (“Tinny, light voices can sound plaintive, 
weak, sometimes desperate, appear to be shouts, sound out of control, and finally and most 
importantly, are difficult to listen to, and so in the end they can be ignored.”). 
91. CHILDRESS, supra note 88, at 297, 348 (quoted in THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT, supra 
note 88, at 18, 22). 
92. Vocal fry is described as “a voice quality accompanied by creaking, cracking, and popping 
noises.” Rindy C. Anderson et al., Vocal Fry May Undermine the Success of Young Women in the 
Labor Market, PLOS ONE (2014) (cited in Michael J. Higdon, Oral Advocacy and Vocal Fry: The 
Unseemly, Sexist Side of Nonverbal Persuasion, 13 JALWD 1, 3 (2016) [hereinafter Oral Advocacy 
and Vocal Fry]). 
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and certainly as less professional, credible, or persuasive than men who 
employ the same technique.93 
Like the deep, resonant voice, the warrior stance also lives on in 
modern moot-court advice. Dworsky even explicitly ties it to the notion 
of strength, counseling advocates that “[y]our stance should be as solid as 
your argument. Face the judges squarely, with legs straight and both feet 
planted firmly on the floor about shoulder-width apart. Keep your head up 
and your back straight. An upright stance suggests honesty and 
strength.”94 Some variation of this same advice appeared—sometimes 
multiple times—in virtually every book or article on oral advocacy that 
this author consulted, including those texts that spent little time on matters 
of demeanor and style.95 One writer even confessed that the moot-court 
program at a law school at which he previously worked had codified this 
warrior bearing as the “Stetson Stance”: “The Moot Court people at that 
law school teach students to approach the podium, spread their legs further 
apart than their shoulders, and grasp the podium to center themselves.”96 
Similarly, like the Classical speaker, modern moot-court advocates 
are counseled to strive for invisibility lest their words be lost amongst 
distractions. Attire should not draw attention to itself or to the advocate’s 
body, even (or especially) if that body is appealing.97 Advocates are 
93. Oral Advocacy and Vocal Fry, supra note 92, at 6 (“[A]mong speakers using vocal fry,
women are perceived more negatively than men.”). Indeed, one 2014 study found that young women 
using vocal fry are perceived as “less competent, less educated, less trustworthy, less attractive, and 
less hirable.” Oral Advocacy and Vocal Fry, supra note 92, at 5 (citing Anderson et al., supra note 
92).  
94. DWORSKY, supra note 89, at 38-39. 
95. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 87, at 165 (“stand erect”) and 183 (“stand up
straight and speak your piece”); DAVID C. FREDERICK, THE ART OF ORAL ADVOCACY 137 
(Thomson/West 2003) (“an advocate should strive to achieve a professional posture, standing straight 
and tall to argue . . . .”); Id. at 191 (explaining that professional demeanor includes erect posture); 
Gerald Lebovits, Drew Gewuerz & Christopher Hunker, Winning the Moot Court Oral Argument: A 
Guide for Intramural and Intermural Moot Court Competitors, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 887, 917 (2013) 
(“ [Advocates] should stand erect with both feet on the ground approximately shoulder length apart.”); 
Id. at 919 (“[A]dvocates should stand with both feet straight and on the ground. Their feet should be 
even with their shoulders.”); Oral Argument and Impression Management, supra note 88, at 643-44 
(explaining that posture should be non-rigid but erect and confident); Id. at 657 (quoting BRADLEY 
G. CLARY ET AL., ADVOCACY ON APPEAL 116 (2001) (“[P]lant your feet squarely on the ground and 
stand in one position.”)); James D. Dimitri, Stepping Up to the Podium with Confidence: A Primer 
for Law Students on Preparing and Delivering an Appellate Oral Argument, 38 STETSON L. REV. 75, 
103 (2008) (“Your posture at the podium should be even. Stand up straight and face the bench. Do 
not stand leaning on one leg, and do not shift your weight from one leg to the other.”). 
96. Ronald J. Rychlak, Effective Appellate Advocacy: Tips from the Teams, 66 MISS. L.J. 527, 
534 (1997). 
97. DWORSKY, supra note 89, at 38 (“The guiding principle of dressing for oral argument is
not to wear anything that draws attention to itself or your body . . . . [Y]ou are not allowed to use your 
body’s beauty to influence the judges.”); see also Lebovits et al., supra note 95, at 916 (asserting that 
16
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warned that everything from too many gestures, too few gestures, poorly 
timed gestures, gestures at the wrong height, improper vocal volume, and 
inappropriate vocal inflections could distract the court from the substance 
of even the most masterfully reasoned and worded argument.98 
Even advice not so closely tied to the values of Classical rhetoric 
tends to favor dress, demeanor, and delivery associated with white men. 
Dworsky puts it most bluntly in talking about courtroom appearance: 
“[J]udges . . . tend to trust people who look like them.”99 More than one 
source suggests that short hair lends an advocate more credibility, whether 
that advocate be male or female.100 Women are counseled to wear updos 
if they are unwilling to cut their hair.101 Long hair, at least in American 
culture, is more commonly associated with femininity, and, indeed, with 
female sexual attractiveness.102 Vocal tics associated with women, 
including uptalk,103 vocal fry,104 and tag questions,105 all draw 
disapproval. And the head tilt that one of the judges in Morrison’s article 
characterized as offensively “cutesy” when coming from a woman seems 
attire should be conservative and not distracting); Coleen M. Barger, How to Make the Losing Oral 
Argument, ARK. LAW. 16 (2006) (To make the losing argument, “wear the kind of clothing or jewelry 
that will attract the Court’s attention.”). 
98. See, e.g., Hon. Jacques L. Wiener, Jr., Ruminations from the Bench: Brief Writing and Oral 
Argument in the Fifth Circuit, 70 TUL. L. REV. 187, 205 (1995) (quoted in THE WINNING ORAL 
ARGUMENT, supra note 88, at 96) (“Try not to talk with your hands; that is distracting and 
unprofessional . . . . Do whatever works to make your hands invisible.”); DWORSKY, supra note 89, 
at 24 (stating that vocal and bodily mannerisms can be distracting); Lebovits et al., supra note 95, at 
919 (explaining that too many hand gestures are distracting); Lebovits et al., supra note 95, at 920 
(asserting that hand gestures higher than chest level are distracting). 
99. DWORSKY, supra note 89, at 38. 
 100.  See Oral Argument and Impression Management, supra note 88, at 654 (citing JUDEE K. 
BURGOON ET AL., NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION: THE UNSPOKEN DIALOGUE 402, 449); Lebovits et 
al., supra note 95, at 916 (stating that hair should be short). 
 101.  Oral Argument and Impression Management, supra note 88, at 654 (citing TONYA 
REIMAN, THE POWER OF BODY LANGUAGE: HOW TO SUCCEED IN EVERY BUSINESS AND SOCIAL 
ENCOUNTER 222 (2007)) (“Ladies, long hair, worn down, no matter how nicely it is kept, no matter 
how good it looks, is not usually considered professional.”). 
 102.  See JOHN KNOWLTON & STEVEN PEARCE, HANDBOOK OF COSMETIC SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY 495 (1993) (cited in Oral Advocacy and Vocal Fry, supra note 92, at 2.) 
 103.  See Lebovits et al., supra note 95, at 921; DWORSKY, supra note 89, at 43 (“[A]void ending 
a sentence with a rising inflection.”); Yana Skorobogatov, What’s Up With Upspeak?, UC BERKELEY 
SOCIAL SCIENCE MATRIX (Sept. 21, 2015), http://matrix.berkeley.edu/research/whats-upspeak 
[http://perma.cc/24RY-9CC4] (stating that uptalk is most often associated with female speakers). 
 104.  From Upspeak to Vocal Fry: Are We ‘Policing’ Young Women’s Voices?, NPR (July 23, 
2015, 1:49 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/07/23/425608745/from-upspeak-to-vocal-fry-are-we-
policing-young-womens-voices [https://perma.cc/LG3E-A6NS] (explaining that a tendency to draw 
out the end of words or sentences with a low, creaky voice is associated with women, although men 
also engage in those habits). 
 105.  See Betty Lous Dubois & Isabel Crouch, The Question of Tag Questions in Women’s 
Speech: They Don’t Really Use More of Them, Do They?, 4 LANGUAGE IN SOC’Y 289 (1975).  
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to split the vote. According to one source, a head tilt increases credibility, 
depending, of course, on the direction of that head tilt.106 
C. Teach, Coach, Judge: A Continuation or Revival of Classical 
Rhetoric Values? 
Oral-argument judges and coaches often amplify the gendered (and 
otherwise biased) nature of the Classical model and other conventional 
wisdom about dress, delivery, and demeanor. As I noted in the 
Introduction, depressingly little has changed since Mairi Morrison first 
tackled this issue in 1995. Many of the anecdotes I collected from my 
colleagues around the country107 eerily echo those Morrison set forth in 
her piece 20 years ago and perpetuate Classical values that privilege 
white-male traits. For the most part, the days of moot-court judges who 
call male advocates “Mr. [Last name]” and female advocates their first 
names,108 who reminisce sadly about the “good old days” when the 
profession did not include “those people,”109 or who change the rules of 
the competition on the fly to award prizes to male advocates (after telling 
the only female advocate that she gave the best oral presentation),110 are 
long passed.111 That said, two email solicitations to listservs of moot-court 
and legal-writing professors quickly elicited an avalanche of examples of 
coaching or feedback that reinforced the male paradigm. 
Unsurprisingly, many moot-court judges and coaches cloak 
gendered112 critiques in the language of avoiding distractions from the 
substance of an argument. Just as Morrison pinpointed in her article, 
however, much of what conventional moot-court wisdom styles as 
distractions from the substance are in fact simply deviations from the male 
106.  Oral Argument and Impression Management, supra note 88, at 643. 
 107.  In all instances, these anecdotes are documented in emails on file with the author. That 
said, many of the sources requested anonymity. They attend or run moot-court competitions every 
year, and they value good relationships with competition administrators and with the judges they 
recruit. Thus, this Article omits nonessential information from the anecdotes to preserve anonymity, 
and, naturally, does not identify its sources by name. 
108.  See E-mail to author (Sept. 4, 2015) (on file with author). 
109.  See id.  
110.  See E-mail from J.R. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author). 
111.  Then again, people did disclose some shockingly archaic conduct from recent years. A 
legal-writing professor reported that her student named “Chastity” was about to give her first oral 
argument when one of the judges leered at her and said, “[Y]ou don’t look like a ‘Chastity.’” See E-
mail from C.K. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author). And one judge openly commented 
upon one competitor’s large breasts. See E-mail from A.H. to author (Sept. 5, 2015) (on file with 
author). 
112.  And race-based, and heterocentric, and ableist . . . . 
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norm.113 Being notably female is distracting. Being a female of color is 
especially distracting. Female advocates are routinely told that suits that 
fail to disguise their large breasts or shapely figures are “distracting.” One 
advocate was told to center herself more behind the podium to hide her 
“distracting” breasts.114 A woman wearing a skirt suit cut a bit above the 
knee and a blouse that hinted at the existence of cleavage was told that her 
clothing was “distracting.”115 Female advocates are routinely told that 
long hair is “distracting.”116 In essence, if a female advocate looks too 
much like a woman—or not enough like traditional conceptions of a 
woman—moot-court judges find that extremely distracting. 
Many comments reinforce the Classical notion that the only 
acceptable voice for an advocate is a deep, resonant one. One coach 
reported that an older, white, male judge counseled her all-female team 
that women’s voices were “just too hard to listen to because they were 
high and shrill” and stated that his “best advice” would be to “lower their 
voices at least two octaves” so that they would not be “painful for men to 
listen to.”117 One female advocate with a soft, relatively high-pitched 
voice was told she had a “baby voice” and that she “sounded like she 
lacked confidence, so it was harder to take her arguments seriously.”118 
Oral-argument judges routinely devote the vast majority of their 
post-argument commentary to matters of style and appearance, but that 
feedback is frequently directed primarily or exclusively to women. 
Multiple coaches and advocates cited the example of one older female 
judge at a national competition who spent almost 15 minutes lecturing 
primarily the female advocates on matters of dress.119 Although she did 
mention tie color briefly, she spent the bulk of her time warning at great 
length against what she deemed to be inappropriate jewelry, hairstyles, 
and blouse styles. Meanwhile, at the same competition two years earlier, 
a coach observed a young male advocate who had added very 
noticeable—and very artificial-looking—grey streaks in his dark hair with 
a visibly powdery spray-on hair color; not a single judge on three panels 
mentioned it, and overall the advocate received strong scores.120 
113.  Morrison, supra note 9.  
 114.  In fairness, that judge was inebriated. See E-mail from A.H to author (Sept. 5, 2015) (on 
file with author). 
115.  See E-mail from E.F. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author). 
116.  See, e.g., E-mail from J.R to author (Sept. 7, 2015) (on file with author). 
117.  See E-mail from S.C. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author). 
118.  See E-mail from E.F to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author). 
119.  See, e.g., E-mail from R.S. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author); Facebook 
posting of H.B. (on file with author). 
120.  See Facebook posting of M.S. (on file with author). 
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Some moot-court judges still seem to resist advocates who fail to 
visually evoke the tall, masculine Classical warrior. One petite female 
advocate reported being told that her argument was “adorable,” but that 
she was “too short to be a litigator.”121 Another petite female advocate 
was told that the judge guessed the courts would need to implement step 
stools now that so many women were becoming lawyers.122 Still another 
petite female advocate was counseled to “take up more space” at the 
podium.123 
It is not unusual for judges to focus their appearance- or demeanor-
based comments solely on the female competitors. In one round of a 
national specialty competition, a judge commented that a particular 
female advocate “smiled too much.”124 None of the male advocates 
received feedback on their facial expressions. In the following round, 
which was a semi-final elimination round, the panel of four older, male 
judges provided no individual feedback, other than praising the female 
advocate on one team for her “gold star smile” and telling the only other 
female advocate—the same one who had been critiqued earlier for smiling 
too much—to smile more. The team with the “gold star smile” won the 
round and advanced to the finals.125 
Moot-court judges seem to echo the advice of moot-court texts that 
short hair, or at least hair that is pulled back in a bun or twist so as to make 
it appear to be short, looks more professional. Some moot-court programs 
even require female advocates to wear their hair back.126 Men are 
counseled to have short hair; one judge—who himself was wearing a 
large, heavy bracelet that clunked on the bench every time he gestured—
criticized one male advocate’s longer hair as “distracting” but “maybe ok 
for a civil-rights lawyer or something.”127 One former competitor reported 
that a female judge subtracted five points from the competitor’s overall 
oral-argument score because the competitor wore her shoulder-length hair 
down and styled curly.128 
Just as Classical values cast the female speaker as either an 
“androgyne” or as an “unnatural freak,” depending on whether she 
presented in a more masculine way or a more feminine one,129 modern 
121.  See Facebook posting of A.S. (on file with author). 
122.  See E-mail from A.M. to author (Sept. 15, 2016) (on file with author). 
123.  See E-mail from M.B. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author). 
124.  See E-mail from V.L. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author). 
125.  Id. 
126.  See E-mail from C.K. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author). 
127.  This author observed this particular incident. 
128.  See E-mail from J.O. to author (Sept. 16, 2016) (on file with author). 
129.  See supra Part II.A.  
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female moot-court advocates have to walk a fine line or risk harsh critique. 
One coach described a blond, exceptionally conventionally attractive 
female advocate wearing a conservative skirt suit being chastised by a 
male judge right out of the gate: “Don’t ever come into my courtroom and 
smile at me like that ever again! Don’t think that you can sway a judge’s 
opinion with your overt sex appeal. That is unprofessional.”130 The 
advocate had done nothing any of the other advocates had not done; she 
had simply approached the podium and launched into her excellent oral 
argument. She had not smiled, and she certainly had not been flirtatious. 
At the same time, not being “feminine enough” poses a problem for some 
advocates. Another coach recounted an argument he observed where a 
female advocate whom he characterized as “present[ing] as a lesbian” 
gave a confident argument.131 Her opponent, a woman whose appearance 
was more traditionally feminine, struggled to answer fairly predictable 
questions. During the post-argument feedback, the judges told the first 
woman that perhaps she could smile more (her argument required her to 
defend the constitutionality of withholding hormone treatment for 
transwomen, hardly an issue to smile about). By contrast, the judges 
praised her opponent’s “thoughtfulness” and that she “took her time” to 
answer a question.132 
And a female lawyer in a pantsuit still seems to unsettle a significant 
number of moot-court judges, even in 2016. Coaches and female 
competitors frequently reported women losing points for wearing 
pantsuits, being chastised in post-argument feedback for wearing 
pantsuits, or being subject to a school- or program-wide policy requiring 
female competitors to wear skirt suits.133 
IV. ORAL ARGUMENT ABILITY IS “NATURAL”: MINDSET THEORY AND
STEREOTYPE THREAT 
Aside from reinforcing the dress, demeanor, and delivery of the 
white male as “neutral” and “non-distracting,” law school also perpetuates 
the notion that certain abilities are inborn, innate, or natural—and thus, by 
extension, inextricably bound up with other inborn traits such as sex, race, 
130.  See E-mail from G.B. to author (Sept. 5, 2015) (on file with author). 
131.  See E-mail from S.H. to author (Sept. 4, 2015) (on file with author). 
132.  Id. 
133.  See, e.g., E-mail from L.C. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author); E-mail from 
S.H. to author (Sept. 15, 2016). I should note that this advice may reflect the real world, at least as it 
existed in 2000. When I began my legal career at a large law firm in Los Angeles, other attorneys told 
me that the firm had a policy that female lawyers were not to wear pants suits to federal court. And I 
was told that the policy resulted from the policies of many of the judges in that court. 
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ethnicity, sexuality, or some forms of disability—and perhaps nowhere is 
this more true than in moot court. Section IV discusses mindset theory and 
stereotype threat theory and posits that employing these theories in 
teaching oral advocacy can help to sever the connection, at least in the 
minds of future lawyers, between inborn traits and oral-advocacy skill. 
A.  Mindset Theory 
Psychologist Carol Dweck calls this implicit belief that intelligence 
and talents are traits fixed at birth a “fixed” or “entity” mindset.134 People 
with this fixed mindset see failure or even struggles in their first efforts in 
a particular area as an indicator of their innate abilities and their future 
potential for success in that area.135 Their goals relate more to 
demonstrating and documenting—rather than developing—their 
abilities.136 This leads people with fixed mindsets to avoid activities that 
might cause them to struggle or fail; instead, they will repeat tasks at 
which they have performed well in the past.137 And people with a fixed 
mindset see effort as futile; why work hard if abilities are fixed at birth?138 
Praise based on innate ability—rather than praise based on effort, on 
successful implementation of feedback, or on developing sound strategies 
for success—instill this fixed mindset.139 Sometimes referred to as “ability 
praise,” it attributes accomplishments to something innate and outside the 
student’s control.140 For example, praising a student who performs well 
on a math exam by saying, “You are so smart! You are so good at math!” 
reinforces the notion that an inborn intelligence and talent for math, rather 
than practice and study, predetermined that outcome.141 
Moreover, an educator’s own implicit beliefs about talent and 
intelligence can influence a student’s mindset.142 Not surprisingly, an 
individual’s implicit beliefs affect the type of feedback she provides; one 
 134.  Carol S. Dweck & Ellen L. Leggett, A Social-Cognitive Approach to Motivation and 
Personality, 95 PSYCHOL. REV. 256, 259 (1988); CAROL S. DWECK, MINDSET: THE NEW 
PSYCHOLOGY OF SUCCESS 11 (Ballantine Books 2006) [hereinafter MINDSET]. 
 135.  See Carrie Sperling & Susan Shapcott, Fixing Students’ Fixed Mindsets: Paving the Way 
for Meaningful Assessment, 18 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 39, 54 (2012). 
136.  Dweck & Leggett, supra note 134, at 256. 
137.  MINDSET, supra note 134, at 108-09.  
138.  Id. at 112, 114, 148. 
139.  Id. at 83-90.  
140.  Id. at 71-73.  
141.  Id. at 169-70.  
142.  Sperling & Shapcott, supra note 135, at 7 (citing Kyunghee Lee, A Study of Teacher 
Responses Based on Their Conceptions of Intelligence, 31 J. OF CLASSROOM INTERACTION 1, 9 
(1996)). 
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who believes that abilities are fixed at birth is more likely to give ability-
oriented feedback.143 A coach who praises a student as a “natural 
advocate” or as being a “talented oralist,” for example, risks instilling or 
reinforcing a fixed mindset in students.144 
An atmosphere that labels people based on “ability” can help induce 
a fixed mindset, and an environment that values people based on external 
indicia like grades or class ranking is the perfect breeding ground.145 In 
Mindset, Dweck provides an example of an environment most likely to 
create a fixed mindset: a grade-school teacher seated students around the 
classroom in order of IQ, and rewarded only the high-IQ students with 
roles like carrying the flag, clapping the erasers, or ferrying notes to the 
principal.146 
1. Law School Induces Fixed Mindsets, and Moot-Court Values
Can Exacerbate Them
Law schools arguably attract people more likely to have fixed 
mindsets—law students are generally high achievers accustomed to being 
praised for their intelligence and ability—but they almost certainly induce 
fixed mindsets in their students and even their applicants. Law students 
are selected, in part, based on their scores on the Law School Admissions 
Test (LSAT), a test that purports to measure innate ability.147 The Law 
School Admissions Council—the entity that administers the LSAT—is so 
 143.  Sperling & Shapcott, supra note 135, at 7 (citing Kyunghee Lee, A Study of Teacher 
Responses Based on Their Conceptions of Intelligence, 31 J. OF CLASSROOM INTERACTION 1, 9 
(1996)). 
144.  See Corie Rosen, The Method and the Message, 12 NEV. L.J. 160, 167 (2011).  
 145.  MINDSET, supra note 134, at 16, 18, 141. See also id. at 167 (“[F]ocus on extrinsic 
motivators is indicative of an environment that relies on ‘ability labeling,’ the process by which some 
people are labeled as smart and others are labeled as less so—the basic contours of a structure that 
promotes the entity mindset.”).  
146.  Id. at 6; Rosen, supra note 144, at 168. 
147.  About the LSAT, L. SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, INC., http://www.lsac.org/jd/lsat/about-the-
lsat [http://perma.cc/WBC3-2YL8] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) (“[The LSAT] provides a standard 
measure of acquired reading and verbal reasoning skills.”). Fortunately, there are signs of a trend 
against this overreliance on the LSAT. Many law schools took advantage of a short-lived A.B.A. 
program that allowed them to admit a limited number of students without LSAT scores. Delece Smith-
Barrow, As Law Schools Undergo Reform, Some Relax LSAT Requirements, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 2, 2015, 
9:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-law-
schools/articles/2015/04/02/as-law-schools-undergo-reform-some-relax-lsat-requirements 
[http://perma.cc/NSR2-R3Y9]. And Arizona Law, where this author teaches, recently received 
permission to admit students using either GRE scores or LSAT scores. Elizabeth Olson, Law School 
That Accepts GRE Scores Can Continue On, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/10/business/dealbook/law-school-that-accepts-gre-scores-can-
continue-on.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/CJH8-FECZ].  
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certain that ability is fixed that it advises students that retaking the exam 
is unlikely to produce a different score, even if the student were to study 
diligently.148 In fact, a student who materially raises his or her LSAT score 
in a second administration risks being investigated for cheating.149 
Once a student reaches law school, the law-school culture cements 
this notion that ability is innate. The belief that “success in law school is 
exclusively demonstrated by high grades, appointment to a law review, 
and similar academic honors” is “entirely obvious at most law schools, 
whether elite or more typical.”150 Grades in the first year of law school—
often primarily derived from a single exam in each class at the end of the 
semester151—determine eligibility for the high-status, high-paying jobs 
that law schools program their students to value most (and that, quite 
frankly, may be necessary to afford the student-loan debt many modern 
law students carry).152 Dweck’s scenario where the grade-school teacher 
seated her students by IQ tests and reserved certain privileges for those 
with the highest IQs eerily mirrors the typical law-school practice of 
ranking students by GPA and granting the highest-ranking students 
special indicia of status like law review membership.153 Few would argue 
that, in law school, grades and class rank function as labels of ability and 
worth, and no environment is more likely to instill a belief that ability is 
an entity fixed at birth. This belief even influences the prevailing method 
for ranking law schools, which heavily weights the LSAT scores of 
entering students, suggesting that one of the greatest indicators of a law 
 148.  Repeating the LSAT, L. SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, INC., http://lsac.org/jd/lsat/repeating-
the-lsat [http://perma.cc/BG7E-66Q4] (last visited Sept. 5, 2017) (“If your score is a fairly accurate 
reflection of your ability, it is unlikely that retaking the test will result in a substantially different 
score.”); James D. Gordon III, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100 YALE L.J. 1679, 1682 (“The 
LSAT people say that LSAT preparation courses do not help, since the LSAT tests knowledge and 
skills that cannot be improved by last minute cramming.”); see also Sperling & Shapcott, supra note 
135, at 68-69. 
 149.  Repeating the LSAT, supra note 148 (“[U]nusually large score differences are routinely 
reviewed by LSAC for misconduct or irregularity.”); see also Sperling & Shapcott, supra note 135, 
at 69. 
 150.  Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial About the Dark Side of Law School, and Fresh 
Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 112, 117 (2002). 
 151.  Sperling & Shapcott, supra note 135, at 70 (citing Ron M. Aizen, Note, Four Ways to 
Better 1L Assessments, 54 DUKE L.J. 765 (2004) and Steven Friedland, A Critical Inquiry Into the 
Traditional Uses of Law School Evaluation, 23 PACE L. REV. 147 (2002)). 
 152.  See Krieger, supra note 150, at 123 (“[Law students with the highest grades] immediately 
and significantly shifted away from service-oriented career preferences and toward lucrative, high-
status career choices.”) and n.4 (acknowledging that high debt load may play a role in this 
phenomenon, but asserting that it does not altogether explain it). 
153.  See Rosen, supra note 144, at 168. 
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school’s quality is the inborn aptitude of the students it is able to attract 
rather than anything that happens during the following three years.154 
The values of Classical rhetoric feed into this fixed mindset. 
Quintillian, for example, believed that elite demeanor manifested good 
character: “a good orator is a good man.”155 Aristotle advanced the belief 
that nature designated some men leaders from birth and others slaves.156 
One’s “natural” posture, gestures, and demeanor betrayed inborn qualities 
of credibility and rationality; “good posture indicates the superiority of 
mind.”157 Similarly, so-called “popular” delivery and demeanor—less 
restrained of gesture, more emotional and dramatic—reflected an inborn 
inner nature tending toward vulnerability, cowardice, irrationality, 
deception, and flight.158 
Modern advice on oral argument—particularly that focused on 
demeanor and delivery—sometimes treats advocacy skill as “natural.”159 
And moot-court coaches and judges may also fall into this trap, praising 
a student as a “natural advocate” or having “talent” for oral argument. 
2. The Antidote to a Fixed Mindset
Fortunately, however, mindsets are malleable.160 In an early study, 
Dweck and other researchers were able to manipulate children’s implicit 
theories of intelligence by having them read passages that described the 
abilities of certain famous people as either fixed at birth or shaped through 
effort.161 The children who read the passages describing intelligence as 
malleable were more likely to demonstrate traits associated with a growth 
 154.  See Jeffrey Evan Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations, and 
Resource Allocation: Why Rankings Mislead, 81 IND. L.J. 229, 244 (2006). See also Sperling & 
Shapcott, supra note 135, at 70. 
155.  See O’Regan, supra note 5, at 393. 
 156.  Id. at 394 (citing ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1254b25, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 
(Richard McKeon ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House, Inc. 1941)).  
157.  O’Regan, supra note 5, at 393. Even Aristotle did allow for the occasional “soul in the 
wrong body” conundrum, however. Id. at 394.  
158.  O’Regan, supra note 5, at 399, 403, 409.  
 159.  See, e.g., DWORSKY, supra note 89, at 24 (“[Some people] naturally possess a strong, 
confident, respectful-yet-conversational speaking style, naturally use effective gestures, facial 
expressions, and vocal dynamics, and naturally are free of distracting vocal and bodily mannerisms . 
. . .”); Lebovits et al., supra note 95, at 941 (asserting that some people have no talent for oratory; 
some are gifted speakers); Eric J. Magnuson, Oral Argument – Learn by Listening, ROBINS KAPLAN 
(Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.robinskaplan.com/resources/articles/briefly-oral-argument-learn-by-
listening [http://perma.cc/SJB5-TVAE] (explaining that to some, oral advocacy is a “natural born 
skill”).  
160.  Carol S. Dweck et al., Implicit Theories of Intelligence as Determinants of Achievement 
Goal Choice (1982) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard Univ.). 
161.  Id.  
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mindset, such as choosing a problem with learning goals as their next 
assignment.162 In another study with graduate students of business, 
researchers split the students into two groups: one was given a fixed 
mindset and told that the assigned task measured underlying capabilities, 
and the other was given a growth mindset and told that management skills 
were developed through practice.163 The fixed mindset group fell short; 
the students in the growth mindset group “looked directly at their 
mistakes, used the feedback, and altered their strategies accordingly.”164 
Just as a coach or professor with a fixed mindset, providing ability-
oriented praise, can foster a fixed mindset in students, so can a coach or 
professor with a growth mindset, providing praise that values learning and 
effort, help instill the belief that abilities—such as oral advocacy skill—
are not inborn but rather malleable,165 thereby helping to disconnect them 
from other inborn traits like gender. 
B. The Role of Stereotype Threat and Self-fulfilling Prophecies 
The phenomenon of stereotype threat likely exacerbates the impact 
of ingrained assumptions about what a good advocate looks and sounds 
like by making women and members of other groups perform more poorly 
than they otherwise would. Stereotype threat refers to the “social-
psychological threat that arises when one is in a situation or doing 
something for which a negative stereotype about one’s group applies.”166 
Social-science research suggests that stereotype threat causes the person 
experiencing it to perform more poorly at the task than she ordinarily 
would, often creating a cycle of diminished achievement in that area. 
For example, in a series of studies, social scientists Claude Steele and 
Joshua Aronson demonstrated that black students performed more poorly 
on a series of verbal Graduate Record Exam (GRE) questions when they 
were reminded of their race or they were told that the test measured 
cognitive ability, a trait about which there are negative stereotypes 
relating to black people.167 Simply asking the black students to identify 
their race at the beginning of the test adversely affected performance; 
black students not asked to provide racial or ethnic data either 
162.  Id. 
163.  MINDSET, supra note 134, at 111.  
164.  Id. 
165.  Dweck et al., supra note 160.  
166.  Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and 
Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 613, 614 (1997). 
 167.  Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test 
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995). 
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outperformed the white students or did just as well.168 Where the students 
were told that the test measured inherent intellectual ability, the black 
students performed worse; where they were told that the same test 
measured problem-solving skills, about which there are no negative 
stereotypes about black people, the black students again performed as well 
as or better than the white students.169 
A person can experience stereotype threat without any actual 
prejudice or bias in the immediate environment.170 Rather, to provoke 
stereotype threat, a person generally need only be reminded of the 
negative stereotype and its relevance to a given task.171 Explicit 
reminders—such as being required to fill in a bubble identifying one’s 
race before taking a standardized test, for example—are not necessary; 
however, simply being aware of the negative stereotype about a group to 
which one belongs suffices to create a “threatening intellectual 
environment” and trigger the negative effects of stereotype threat.172 The 
more that an individual experiencing stereotype threat thinks about the 
negative stereotype, the more performance suffers.173 And the reminder 
of the negative stereotype can take a variety of forms. For example, 
women outnumbered by men in a testing room performed worse on a 
series of GRE math questions than did women administered the same 
questions in a single-sex environment.174 The women were not asked 
about gender or reminded in any other way of their gender or the 
stereotype that women have poorer math skills.175 Simply being 
outnumbered by men in the testing environment was enough to invoke the 
stereotype and cause the effects of stereotype threat.176 In fact, the 
negative effects of stereotype threat increased to the extent that the women 
were outnumbered; the greater the percentage of men in the room, the 
worse the women performed.177 
168.  Id. at 801.  
169.  Id. at 805-06.  
170.  Geoffrey L. Cohen et al., An Identity Threat Perspective on Intervention, STEREOTYPE 
THREAT: THEORY, PROCESS, AND APPLICATION 281 (Michael Inzlicht & Toni Schmader eds., 2012) 
[hereinafter An Identity Threat Perspective].  
171.  Id.  
172.  Steele & Aronson, supra note 167, at 808. 
173.  Mara Cadinu et al., Why Do Women Underperform Under Stereotype Threat?: Evidence 
for the Role of Negative Thinking, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 572 (2005).  
 174.  Michael Inzlicht & Talia Ben-Zeev, A Threatening Intellectual Environment: Why Females 
Are Susceptible to Experiencing Problem-Solving Deficits in the Presence of Males, 11 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 365, 368 (Sept. 2000). 
175.  Id. 
176.  Id. 
177.  Id. at 369. 
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Countless studies over the past 20 years have demonstrated the 
existence and effects of stereotype threat in a variety of situations 
involving a variety of groups.178 One particularly interesting study showed 
that when Asian-American women were primed with reminders that they 
were female (and therefore stereotypically bad at math) before taking a 
math test, they performed worse than the control group; when another 
group of Asian-American women were reminded that they were Asian 
(and therefore stereotypically good at math) before the same test, they 
performed better than the control group.179 
Sadly, simply working harder at a task or being more invested will 
not help a person overcome the drag of stereotype threat; in fact, the 
opposite appears to be true. The more that a person cares about performing 
well at a given task, the more stereotype threat will hinder that 
performance.180 In a study of black students at a high school in Southern 
California who were given a section of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) 
verbal exam, those students who self-identified as caring about academic 
performance suffered the impact of stereotype threat significantly more 
than those who self-identified as not caring about achieving in school.181 
In fact, the black students who self-identified as not caring performed no 
worse than did the white students who self-identified as caring.182 
Unfortunately, though, caring less does not seem to be the answer to the 
dilemma: the black students who did not care about school still performed 
quite poorly on the test, even without the impact of stereotype threat.183 
Moreover, stereotype threat is recursive; it creates a sucking 
downward spiral where each stereotype-threat-provoked 
 178.  See, e.g., Bettina Spencer & Emanuele Castano, Social Class is Dead. Long Live Social 
Class! Stereotype Threat Among Low Socioeconomic Status Individuals, 20 SOC. JUST. RES. 418 
(2007) (observing effects of stereotype threat in academic performance of students of lower 
socioeconomic class); Thomas M. Hess et al., The Impact of Stereotype Threat on Age Differences in 
Memory Performance, 58 J. GERONTOL. B. PSYCHOL. SCI. SOC. SCI. P3 (2003) (observing effect of 
stereotype threat on memory-test performance of older individuals). See also CLAUDE M. STEELE, 
WHISTLING VIVALDI: HOW STEREOTYPES AFFECT US AND WHAT WE CAN DO 97 (2010) [hereinafter 
VIVALDI] (“The effect [of stereotype threat] has been observed in women, African Americans, white 
males, Latino Americans, third-grade American schoolgirls, Asian American students, European 
males aspiring to be clinical psychologists . . . French college students, German grade school girls, 
U.S. soldiers on army bases in Italy, women business school students, white and black athletes, older 
Americans, and so on.”); Jonathan Feingold, Note, Racing Towards Color-Blindness: Stereotype 
Threat and the Myth of Meritocracy, 3 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 231, 238 (2011).  
 179.  See Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in 
Quantitative Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 80, 80-81 (1999). 
180.  VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 56. 
181.  Id. at 56-57. 
182.  Id. at 57. 
183.  Id. 
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underperformance strengthens the negative power of the stereotype.184 An 
early stumble leads a student to be labeled unskilled in a particular area. 
Frustrations and apprehension about confirming the stereotype condemn 
the student to realize her worst fears. The intensification of the negative 
stereotype amplifies the risk of future failure, virtually assuring it. 
Why and how does stereotype threat affect performance? Anxiety 
plays a role; Steele concluded that the stress and anxiety added by the fear 
of confirming a negative stereotype “leaves little mental capacity free for 
anything else.”185 Particularly where an individual’s group membership 
makes her the minority in a particular group—a woman in an advanced-
level mathematics course, for example—researchers argue that the intense 
pressure to represent one’s group favorably distracts the person from the 
task at hand.186 Studies have concluded that stereotype threat reduces 
working-memory capacity, which makes it more difficult for individuals 
to focus on and successfully complete tasks.187 Stereotype threat is also 
associated with physiological symptoms of heightened arousal like 
elevated blood pressure.188 One can easily imagine the effect that reduced 
working memory and symptoms of heightened arousal could have on an 
already-anxious oral advocate trying to think quickly, remember case 
names and a court’s rationale, and respond effectively to rapid-fire 
questions from the bench. 
The flip side of stereotype threat is what some have called 
“stereotype boost,” or “stereotype susceptibility”: knowledge of a positive 
stereotype about one’s group can actually improve one’s performance in 
the relevant area.189 The improved performance of the Asian-American 
female test subjects when subtly reminded of their Asian identity—and of 
the stereotype that Asians excel at math—illustrated this phenomenon.190 
 184.  An Identity Threat Perspective, supra note 170, at 285-87; VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 176 
(citing to Cohen et al., Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap: A Social-Psychological Intervention, 
313 SCI. 1307 (2006)) [hereinafter Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap]. 
 185.  VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 123. 
186. Delia S. Saenz, Token Status and Problem-Solving Deficits: Detrimental Effects of 
Distinctiveness and Performance Monitoring, 12 SOC. COGNITION 61, 71-72 (1994).  
 187.  Toni Schmader & Michael Johns, Converging Evidence That Stereotype Threat Reduces 
Working Memory Capacity, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 440 (2003).  
 188.  Jason W. Osborne, Gender, Stereotype Threat and Anxiety: Psychophysiological and 
Cognitive Evidence, 8 J. RES. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 109 (2006); Jason W. Osborne, Linking Stereotype 
Threat and Anxiety, 27 EDUC. PSYCHOL. 135 (2007).  
 189.  Shih et al., supra note 179. See also Catherine Martin Christopher, Eye of the Beholder: 
How Perception Management Can Counter Stereotype Threat Among Struggling Law Students, 53 
DUQ. L. REV. 163, 169 (2015). 
190.  Shih et al., supra note 179.  
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Another mirror image of stereotype threat is something labeled 
“stereotype lift.” This occurs when a person gets a performance boost by 
being reminded of a negative stereotype about another group’s 
performance on a relevant task.191 Unfortunately, this phenomenon most 
benefits people who either “believe in the legitimacy of negative 
stereotypes,” or are particularly invested in a hierarchy based in 
membership in favored groups.192 People with low self-esteem seem to 
benefit more from stereotype lift, perhaps because they are more “likely 
to make downward comparisons to protect their self-image.”193 
The way in which a professor, teacher, or other authority figure 
delivers constructive feedback can also affect the impact of stereotype 
threat. The most effective feedback both invokes high standards of 
achievement and conveys a faith in the student’s ability to meet those 
standards.194 Called “wise feedback,” this mode of criticism proves 
significantly more likely to elicit student trust in the feedback and less 
likely to provoke the effects of stereotype threat than feedback delivered 
neutrally, feedback delivered with a more generically reassuring 
statement, or feedback that simply invoked high standard without an 
accompanying expression of faith in the student’s ability to meet that 
standard.195 
In one study, researchers had students write an essay that they were 
told could be published in a campus magazine if it were good enough.196 
All of the students were given individualized critical feedback about the 
grammar, style, and content of the essay.197 They were also given a two-
paragraph, handwritten, general critique that was identical for all 
students.198 One set of students was simply given this feedback.199 A 
second set of students was given the feedback with an introductory 
statement that provided generic, bland encouragement like “overall, nice 
job,” and “you have some interesting ideas in your [essay] and you make 
some good points.”200 The third set of students was given the feedback 
 191.  Gregory M. Walton & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Stereotype Lift, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 456 (2003). 
192.  Id. at 464. 
193.  Id. 
194.  Geoffrey L. Cohen et al., The Mentor’s Dilemma: Providing Critical Feedback Across the 
Racial Divide, 25 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 25, 1302 (1999) [hereinafter The 
Mentor’s Dilemma]; see also VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 162-63. 
195.  The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194, at 1304. 
196.  Id. at 1305. 
197.  Id. at 1306. 
198.  Id. 
199.  Id. 
200.  Id. at 1307. 
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with an introductory statement that stated that the reviewer was applying 
high standards—an honest consideration of whether the essay was of 
publishable quality—and that the reviewer would not have devoted such 
time to the critique had the reviewer not believed that the student could 
meet the high standards.201 The black students who received the third type 
of feedback were more likely to see the feedback as unbiased and 
therefore trustworthy and were more motivated to incorporate that 
feedback into their essays.202 
In Steele’s view, these results showed that “wise feedback”—
feedback that conveyed high standards and a belief in a student’s ability 
to meet those standards—told the students that their reviewer was not 
seeing them through the lens of any negative stereotypes about intellectual 
ability.203 As a result, the weight of stereotype threat lifted and could no 
longer interfere with motivation or performance.204 But one instance of 
“wise feedback” is not necessarily enough: 
In sustained relationships with students, the wise mentor . . . does not 
simply speak of high expectations and a faith in students’ potential. He 
or she also buttresses this message through expenditures of time and ef-
fort, by giving detailed attention to the student’s performance, and by 
providing an empowering pattern of feedback over time.205 
Interestingly, exposing students to the incremental theory of 
ability—instilling a growth mindset—also helps to counteract the impact 
of stereotype threat.206 In one study, researchers asked black and white 
Stanford students to write letters to imaginary minority elementary-school 
children in an economically disadvantaged area.207 The researchers gave 
the Stanford students a script detailing evidence of the malleability of 
intelligence, of people improving their intellectual abilities through hard 
work, and of changes that learning can create in the brain itself.208 The 
black students, after reading this material and writing letters espousing the 
incremental theory of ability, improved their grades in the following 
semester.209 
201.  Id. at 1306-07. 
202.  Id. at 1309-10. 
203.  VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 163 (citing to The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194). 
204.  VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 163 (citing to The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194). 
205.  The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194, at 1316. 
206.  See generally MINDSET, supra note 134; VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 169 (citing to 
Aronson et al., Reducing the Effects of Stereotype Threat on African-American College Students by 
Shaping Theories of Intelligence, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 113 (2002)). 
207.  VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 169 (citing to Aronson et al., supra note 206). 
208.  VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 169 (citing to Aronson et al., supra note 206). 
209.  VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 169 (citing to Aronson et al., supra note 206). 
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Even something as simple as writing a brief self-affirmation can 
reduce the impact of stereotype threat.210 Near the beginning of the 
academic year, researchers had teachers ask some of their seventh-grade 
students to list a value they found most important and then draft a short 
paragraph about why they found that value so important.211 All but a few 
of the highest performing black students improved their grades after this 
exercise.212 Black students not given the same affirmation exercise 
experienced declining grades.213 And this increase or decline persisted for 
at least two years after the affirmation exercise.214 Researchers concluded 
that this exercise worked for two main reasons. First, the affirmation of 
individual integrity and self-worth provided sort of a counter-narrative to 
the negative stereotype, reducing the significance of the negative 
stereotype.215 Second, the self-affirmation “interrupted” the operation of 
stereotype threat, lessening the impact of earlier poor performance or 
evidence of stereotype.216 
V. TENSIONS AND BARRIERS TO CHANGE 
Moot-court educators must navigate among several conflicting 
values in determining how to deal with the pernicious stereotypes that 
undergird much of the traditional advice regarding oral advocacy and 
success in moot-court competitions. 
First, we face a broader, more philosophical tension: should 
marginalized groups “embrace the language of power, and risk being 
coopted by it, or reject the language of power, and risk not being 
heard?”217 This same tension underlies the conflict between the equality 
and difference models of feminism, but it is also instructive in thinking 
about the dilemma facing most traditionally underrepresented groups. The 
 210.  The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194; see also VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 172-73 
(citing to Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap, supra note 184). 
 211.  The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194, at 1307-08; see also VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 
174 (citing to Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap, supra note 184). 
 212.  The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194, at 1308; see also VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 174-
75 (citing to Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap, supra note 184). 
 213.  The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194, at 1309; see also VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 175 
(citing to Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap, supra note 184). 
 214.  See The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194, at 1309; see also VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 
175 (citing to Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap, supra note 184). 
 215.  The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194, at 1309; see also VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 176 
(citing to Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap, supra note 184). 
 216.  The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194, at 1309; see also VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 176 
(citing to Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap, supra note 184). 
 217.  Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance Is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the 
Law’s Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7, 9-10 (1998).
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equality model of feminism holds that women only employ the demeanor, 
intonations, and speech styles of the disempowered because they have 
been socialized to do so; thus, women should emulate men in order to cast 
off this negative socialization and unmask their hidden potential.218 The 
difference model of feminism, on the other hand, posits that these 
disfavored speaking styles have no inherent fault.219 Rather, they are 
disfavored and associated with lack of authority and power because they 
are traditionally associated with women.220 Therefore, we should embrace 
the speaking style generally associated with women and accord it the 
respect and authority it deserves, rather than seeking to train women to 
speak more like white men. Moot-court educators need to make a 
conscious choice regarding which side of the line they choose, and they 
should provide their students with sufficient grounding in these theories 
to make informed decisions as well. 
Second, counseling advocates to adopt the demeanor and speaking 
styles traditionally associated with authority may backfire: one linguistic 
perspective—which shares some philosophical underpinnings with the 
feminist dominance theory—suggests that, regardless of the speaker’s 
demeanor or speaking style, the identity of the speaker and her gender, 
race, and other traits determine whether her speech is valued.221 For 
example, a woman who speaks loudly and with assurance may be 
characterized as “strident” or “combative,” whereas a man speaking in the 
same way would be perceived as “confident” and “assertive.” Similarly, 
a woman who pauses before answering a question may be seen as 
“fumbling,” whereas a man pausing for the same length of time is 
“thoughtful.”222 Thus, a member of a traditionally marginalized group 
who changes her presentation style to comport with common moot-court 
advice risks making absolutely no difference in how moot-court judges 
perceive her argument. 
Third, moot court is supposed to simulate real appellate practice. And 
law is—or at least it should be—a client-focused profession.223 The 
attorney’s personal beliefs, ego, and sensitivities must recede in the face 
of the client’s cause. Thus, if it serves the client’s cause to pander to or 
accommodate pernicious stereotypes—by, for example, wearing a demure 
218.  Id. at 48; see also Morrison, supra note 9, at 73-74. 
219.  Stanchi, supra note 217, at 49; Morrison, supra note 9, at 74-75. 
220.  Stanchi, supra note 217, at 48-49; Morrison, supra note 9, at 75. 
221.  Stanchi, supra note 217, at 49. 
222.  Example borrowed from Stanchi, supra note 217, at 49-50. 
223.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rs. 1.0-1.18 (2016); see also Oral Advocacy and 
Vocal Fry, supra note 92, at 6-7. 
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navy-blue skirt suit rather than a maroon pantsuit, or straightening natural 
African-American hair, or seeking elocution lessons to erase a regional 
accent or modulate a high-pitched voice—is it not incumbent on the 
attorney to pander and accommodate? Moot-court educators should 
explicitly explore this tension with their students, again to enable their 
students to make informed decisions regarding when and whether to 
challenge stereotypes or transgress norms in their advocacy style. 
Fourth, moot court can and should be a learning experience, but 
teams (and their coaches and schools) also want to win. Many schools tout 
their moot-court victories in alumni publications, in new-student 
recruiting materials, in fundraising efforts, and on their websites.224 At 
least one entity ranks law schools by their win/loss records in moot court 
and other legal-skills competitions,225 and students interested in moot 
court and other advocacy programs can consult those rankings in selecting 
a school. If a coach knows that a certain presentation style, even one that 
panders to and reinforces pernicious stereotypes, will make a student 
advocate more successful at competition, does she not have an obligation 
to coach the student to adopt that style? And a coach quickly loses 
credibility with her team if judges blame behavior she condoned in 
explaining why a team lost a round. 
Finally, moot-court coaches often have limited autonomy and 
discretion in how they coach students. At many schools, legal-writing 
faculty run moot-court programs. And, at most schools, legal-writing 
faculty are not eligible for tenure, often at the mercy of renewable short-
term contracts.226 This lack of status and job security makes them 
 224.  For example, UC Hastings College of Law touts that its Moot Court is ranked a top five 
program in the nation for five years in a row. See Awards and Honors, UC HASTINGS COLL. OF L., 
http://www.uchastings.edu/academics/pro-skills-team/moot-court/intercollegiate-
competitions/Acheivements/index.php [http://perma.cc/XM2K-23B7] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017). 
 225.  The University of Houston Law Center’s Andrews Kurth Moot Court National 
Championship—billed as the “Moot Court Competition to determine the ‘best of the best’ Moot Court 
programs”—has developed a scoring system to rank schools by their performance at different moot-
court competitions, based on factors like the type of award and the prestige of the competition. See 
Rankings, U. HOU. L. CTR., http://www.law.uh.edu/blakely/mcnc/rankings.asp 
[http://perma.cc/P8BE-9C5Y] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017). 
 226.  At many institutions, legal-writing professors and other faculty who teach “skills” courses 
often are accorded limited, if any, academic freedom, and they lack power even over their own 
curriculum and pedagogical choices. As a result, skills faculty, and even directors of skills programs, 
often must bow to faculty, administration, and student pressure regarding their curricular and 
pedagogical choices. See Jo Anne Durako, Dismantling Hierarchies: Occupational Segregation of 
Legal Writing Faculty in Law Schools: Separate and Unequal, 73 UMKC L. REV. 253, 267 (2004). 
This is unlikely to change anytime soon. As of 2014, the majority of legal-writing professors and 
directors still are not tenured or on the tenure track. LEGAL WRITING INST., ASS’N OF LEGAL WRITING 
DIRS., REPORT OF THE ANNUAL LEGAL WRITING SURVEY, 64 (Sept. 12, 2017), 
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vulnerable, particularly if their coaching methods and philosophies do not 
produce winning teams, most particularly if students complain about this 
perceived coaching failure. And a significant percentage of moot-court 
coaches are adjunct professors or alumni volunteers with busy legal 
careers, giving them even less time to reflect on the consequences of 
coaching traditional moot-court demeanor and even less incentive to rock 
the boat. Some moot-court coaches are third-year law students, who may 
not have the knowledge, confidence, authority, or perspective to recognize 
and correct advice that has more to do with outdated stereotypes than with 
sound legal argument. 
VI. A MENU OF SOLUTIONS
Twenty years have passed since Professor Morrison first challenged 
moot-court programs to avoid perpetuating gender bias and other biases 
in the profession by avoiding race- and gender-based language, raising 
consciousness of gender bias in legal education and the profession, and 
working to free students of stereotyped expectations.227 But, as I have 
discussed in Part II, little progress has been made in increasing access to 
the highest echelons of the profession for women and other traditionally 
underrepresented groups. And, as I have discussed in Part III, legal 
education has and continues to contribute to that problem by reinforcing 
the notion that the archetypal good lawyer or good oral advocate looks, 
sounds, and acts like the Classical warrior, a role only available to upper-
class white males. Thus, oral-advocacy educators must continue to 
implement and indeed build upon Morrison’s suggestions. Although no 
one solution answers every concern or resolves every tension, moot-court 
faculty, coaches, and competition administrators can take several concrete 
steps to mitigate the impact of bias and minimize the opportunities to 
perpetuate bias. 
A. Suggestions for Educators 
At the outset, these concerns argue for a moot-court program 
primarily run by at least one full-time faculty member228 who devotes a 
http://lwionline.org/uploads/FileUpload/2014SurveyReportFinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/95B2-FZ67] 
(showing that 42 out of 178 schools reported that some of their legal-writing faculty are tenured or 
tenure track); id. at 35 (showing that 32 of 178 schools reported that the director of legal writing is 
tenured or on the tenure track). 
227.  Morrison, supra note 9, at 81-83. 
 228.  Ideally, this person—despite her focus on practical skills—would also be a tenured member 
of the faculty. It is extraordinarily well documented that “legal education has a back of the bus, and 
it’s legal writing.” Melissa H. Weresh, Stars Upon Thars: Evaluating the Discriminatory Impact of 
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significant portion of her time to the study and teaching of advocacy, and 
preferably one assisted by practitioners who devote their careers to 
appellate advocacy. Moot-court programs exclusively run by students are 
notorious hotbeds of bias perpetuation because they tend to value 
oratorical flair over sophisticated, substantive argument.229 Having a full-
time faculty member devoted to running a coherent advocacy program 
also facilitates some of the other solutions outlined later in this section; 
by developing a program that educates its faculty, coaches, judges, and 
students in these theories and best practices, a full-time faculty member is 
best positioned to implement a program-wide philosophy that best 
balances the interests of preparing students for the realities of practice in 
a biased profession while at the same time permitting a diverse array of 
students to find effective voices as advocates and perhaps even become 
agents for change in the profession. 
A program that can be effective in this way must first educate its 
faculty, coaches, and students in the key psychological theories of mindset 
and stereotype threat. By translating the research about mindset theory 
and stereotype threat into how they provide written and oral feedback to 
advocates, coaches and professors can do much to undermine the notion 
that the skills that make a good lawyer are inborn and inextricably tied to 
one sex (or any other immutable trait). They can also disrupt the 
stereotype-threat mechanism that turns negative stereotypes about women 
ABA Standard 405(C) “Tenure-Like” Security of Position, 34 LAW & INEQ. 137, 146-47 (2016). As 
discussed earlier in this Article, legal-writing faculty are seldom tenured. They are also 
overwhelmingly female; as of 2013, approximately 73% of legal-writing faculty were female. Id. at 
139. By contrast, a significant majority—at least 62%—of tenured faculty are men. Id. As Weresh 
notes, when students observe this type of apparent gender bias, it sends a message to students about 
their own future opportunities in the legal field, and it cannot help but reinforce the notion that roles 
associated with women are less prestigious or desirable and that women are less qualified for the roles 
that are more prestigious or desirable. Id. at 148. 
 229.  See Michael Vitiello, Teaching Effective Oral Argument Skills: Forget About the Drama 
Coach, 75 MISS. L.J. 869, 881-83 (2006). Some student-run programs have student boards that see 
moot court as an area where less academically successful students can find a place to shine. This 
means that students who did well in their first year of law school may be excluded from moot court 
(or may choose activities like law review over moot court). Most second- and third-year law students, 
particularly those who did not do as well in their first-year classes, likely lack the knowledge, 
judgment, and experience to discern whether an oral argument is substantively strong or simply 
delivered with flair, and so student boards select student competitors who may be heavy on style and 
short on substance. Vitiello argues that these types of student-run programs risk perpetuating these 
skewed values year after year as students select other students who share their values. Id. at 883. And 
this likely also pollutes the judging pool, which often consists primarily of alumni of the school’s 
moot-court program. Id. at 883-84. Moreover, students generally lack the real-world appellate 
experience to know what real appellate courts value, or to appreciate the reality that the most stylish 
oral argument cannot carry the day if the legal reasoning is flawed. See id. at 891-92; see also Alex 
Kozinski, In Praise of Moot Court—NOT!, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 178, 185 (1997). 
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lawyers into self-fulfilling prophecies that, in turn, perpetuate the 
stereotype. 
The research demonstrates that efforts to instill a growth or 
incremental mindset in students can both avoid the pernicious effects of 
the fixed mindset and neutralize stereotype threat.230 Moot-court 
educators should introduce their students and their team members to the 
idea that talents and intelligence are incremental, rather than inborn, and 
that individuals can improve their abilities and skills through effort. 
Because praise based on “natural ability” helps foster the fixed mindset—
and because it likely also reinforces the idea that oral-advocacy ability is 
inextricably linked with other inborn traits like race or gender—coaches 
should avoid praising students as “natural speakers” or “born advocates.” 
Rather, coaches should encourage the notion that oral advocacy is a skill 
that can be learned and cultivated by focusing praise on how student effort 
from practice session to practice session has improved that student’s 
performance. Coaches—particularly those who have a professional record 
of success in oral advocacy—can recount their own mistakes and 
disappointments and describe techniques they used to improve their own 
advocacy skills. 
Another way educators might bolster a growth mindset would be to 
educate moot-court board members, student coaches, and teaching 
assistants about mindset theory and feedback techniques that instill a 
growth mindset. Not only will this—like the letters the Stanford students 
wrote to the fictional elementary-school students231—reinforce the growth 
mindset in the students learning and applying these techniques, it will also 
ensure that the students receiving feedback are getting a uniform message, 
at least in the moot-court program, that talents and abilities are not fixed 
at birth. 
Other solutions may involve implementing additional techniques 
proven to counter stereotype threat. For example, coaches should consider 
exploiting the stereotype-boost phenomenon and re-framing some oral-
argument tasks as ones at which women stereotypically excel when 
coaching female students. For example, women are stereotypically better 
at verbal tasks, like verbal memory and verbal fluency.232 To provoke a 
boost from this stereotype, coaches may try emphasizing how persuasive 
230.  See supra Part IV. 
231.  See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text. 
 232.  Einar M. Skaalvik & Richard J. Rankin, Gender Differences in Mathematics and Verbal 
Achievement, Self-Perception and Motivation, 64 BRITISH J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 419 (1994); Ann-
Charlotte Smedler & Bertil Törestad, Verbal Intelligence: A Key to Basic Skills?, 22 EDUC. STUD. 
343 (1996). 
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precise word choice can be, or how the ability to accurately recall and 
recount the key facts, holding, and reasoning of a significant case and 
apply them to detailed facts of the case at hand can help the appellate 
advocate respond to the court’s concerns most effectively. Similarly, 
some stereotypes hold that women have better listening skills.233 And few 
things aid the appellate advocate more than listening attentively to—and 
really hearing—the court’s questions and concerns.234 Or coaches could 
stress social sensitivity, which is the ability to read nonverbal cues, 
another essential tool for advocates trying to assess whether a given 
argument resonates with the bench, and another skill stereotypically 
associated with women.235 
Educators can also take advantage of Steele’s “wise feedback” 
philosophy, providing written and oral feedback that both communicates 
that the coach sets high standards and conveys a personal belief in the 
student’s ability to meet those standards.236 Over the long term, wise 
mentoring is hard work; it requires an investment of time and attention in 
each individual student’s success. Not only does the wise mentor need to 
deliver wise feedback consistently, she needs to communicate to each 
student that she cares about that student’s success and believes in her 
capacity to achieve.237 Wise mentoring is not easy with every student—
coaches do not always connect on a personal level with each and every 
individual—and it can be particularly challenging where the moot-court 
coach is a time-strapped practitioner or a faculty member with a 
burdensome course-load of labor-intensive skills classes. But the value it 
233.  Jennifer Romig, Do Men and Women Listen Differently?, LISTEN LIKE A LAWYER (Sept. 
6, 2016), https://listenlikealawyer.com/2016/09/06/do-men-and-women-listen-differently/ 
[http://perma.cc/54J6-NS8W] (“Despite the popular reception of gender asymmetry in the way we 
talk with, listen to, and interact with one another, considerable research suggests that sex differences 
may actually play only a minimal role.”) (citing Stephanie Lee Sargent & James B. Weaver III, 
Listening Styles: Sex Differences in Perceptions of Self and Others, 17 INT’L J. LISTENING 5 (2003)). 
 234.  See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 87, at 191 (advocating careful listening to the 
court’s questioning of self and of adversary); THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT, supra note 88, at 164-
67 (stressing importance of listening to questions from court and to adversary’s argument); Interview 
by Brian Garner with Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Nov. 13, 2006) (quoted in THE WINNING ORAL 
ARGUMENT, supra note 88, at 165) (“You will do best if you concentrate on the questions you are 
being asked.”); Hon. John Roberts, Address at the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference (July 13, 2006) 
(quoted in THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT, supra note 88, at 165 (explaining that when asked what 
he would do differently if he were an advocate again, Chief Justice Roberts replied that he would 
“listen a little more carefully to what the questions are”)); Vitiello, supra note 229, at 887 (asserting 
that what really matters in oral argument is ability to answer court’s questions thoroughly).
 235.  See Anne M. Koenig & Alice H. Eagly, Stereotype Threat in Men on a Test of Social 
Sensitivity, 52 SEX ROLES 489 (2005). 
236.  See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text. 
237.  See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text. 
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can provide to students and to shaping a more just and accessible 
profession make it worth the effort. 
Because the research shows that simple self-affirmation exercises 
can neutralize the impact of stereotype threat,238 moot-court educators 
might take a page from the playbook of their clinical colleagues and have 
students and team members write short, periodic reflection papers or 
journal entries239 that identify a student’s transcendent values and goals 
and how she is applying those values and working toward those goals 
through her work in moot court.240 
In teaching students in moot-court classes or in coaching teams, 
professors and coaches can and should expose students to the advice of 
oral-advocacy experts and to the teachings of Classical rhetoric. Building 
on Professor Morrison’s suggestions that fall in the vein of “teaching the 
controversy,”241 professors and coaches should encourage students to 
think critically about the biases and cultural contexts that underlies this 
advice, particularly when it comes to dress, demeanor, and delivery. We 
should teach a “critical moot court” that interrogates the biases behind 
assumptions about what makes a good oral advocate and permits students 
to make informed choices about which approaches they wish to adopt and 
why. In this way, professors and coaches may strike a balance between 
preparing students for the realities of current law practice and arming 
students to change what the voice of authority sounds like in the legal 
profession. 
Many experts on oral advocacy counsel students to “be yourself.”242 
Although this advice may seem glib, it has particular merit when partnered 
with other advice. For example, the tale of vocal fry shows us that 
attempting to lower one’s voice below its natural register may backfire; a 
coach may counsel a student that, generally, studies have shown that 
people find lower voices more pleasing, but only to the extent that the 
lower voice falls within the speaker’s natural vocal range.243 Gestures 
should not seem calculated but should fit with the speaker’s inflection, 
238.  See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text. 
 239.  See Karen Hinett, Developing Reflective Practice in Legal Education, UK CTR. FOR LEGAL 
EDUC. (2002), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.203.2556&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
[http://perma.cc/R37H-JEFN]. 
240.  Doing so might also enhance learning in other ways, stimulating metacognition. Hinett, 
supra note 239 at 7. And taking advantage of the opportunity for professional-identity formation. 
241.  Morrison, supra note 9, at 56. 
242.  See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 87, at 142. 
243.  See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.  
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intonation, and expression.244 An advocate will be most persuasive when 
she seems genuine, and extreme changes to voice and demeanor can ring 
false with an audience. 
When it comes to competition teams in particular, issues related to 
implicit bias and the teaching opportunities that arise from bad or unfair 
judging make it especially important that at least one coach—preferably 
an adjunct or full-time faculty member, but at least a practitioner volunteer 
rather than a student—attend the competition with each team. Most 
competitions permit coaches to sit at the back of the courtroom during 
competition rounds. Coaches should take notes during the arguments, of 
course, to provide formative feedback to the students. But coaches should 
also take notes during the post-argument feedback from the judges. If a 
coach disagrees with a particular item of feedback from the bench, or if a 
coach fears that a student will misinterpret that feedback because of the 
manner in which it was delivered or because of that particular student’s 
personality, the coach should take time between argument rounds to 
discuss that feedback with the students during a debriefing session. 
Coaches who observe objectionable, bias-driven behavior by judges 
during a competition round should report that behavior to the competition 
administrators, preferably in writing, but perhaps also orally and in person 
(particularly if the behavior is egregious). Some competition 
administrators actually provide comment forms. If the competition does 
not, a letter documenting the behavior in detail—including concrete 
examples and quotations, where appropriate—will suffice. Provide 
examples and quotations if possible. If a competition has systemic 
problems with judges being unprepared or manifesting bias, consider not 
returning to that competition the following year—and tell the competition 
organizers why your team will not be returning. 
And, of course, professors and coaches must be scrupulously attuned 
to their own unjust biases and avoid letting them influence interactions 
with students. Every professor and coach should explore the Project 
Implicit website, for example, and maybe even take the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT).245 Most people whom this author knows who 
have taken the test report being surprised by implicit biases of which they 
were not consciously aware but which made sense to them upon further 
reflection and self-examination. The mere fact that an educator is herself 
 244.  See Oral Argument and Impression Management, supra note 88, at 645-46 (stating that 
research on nonverbal communication suggests that smiles, nods, and gestures can be more persuasive 
than their absence, but must be “synchronized with and supportive of the vocal/verbal stream”). 
 245.  Preliminary Information, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/
takeatest.html [http://perma.cc/H9TC-VKGR] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017). 
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female, of course, does not mean that she does not harbor implicit—or 
explicit—biases against certain traditionally female traits, or that she does 
not inadvertently reward or deter conduct-based sex and gender 
stereotypes. 
B. Suggestions for Competition Administrators 
Moot-court competitions may be the most challenging arena for 
change. Finding enough lawyers and judges willing to volunteer hours of 
their time to prepare for and judge rounds of moot-court oral argument—
particularly a large competition with many competitors and many rounds, 
requiring sometimes nearly a hundred judges—can be time-consuming 
and challenging. And moot-court judges often participate in these 
competitions because they have strong feelings about what a good oral 
advocate looks, sounds, and acts like. But educators, student moot-court 
boards, and others who administer intramural or intermural moot-court 
competitions can take several steps to prevent judges and others from 
reinforcing pernicious stereotypes about what a good lawyer looks and 
sounds like. 
The first and perhaps most challenging step—and one that arguably 
enhances the academic impact of moot court overall—is to shift the focus 
from style to substance. Placing more emphasis on accurate and 
thoughtful discussion of the law, apt and accurate answers to questions 
from the bench, and demonstrated understanding of the legal, factual, and 
policy issues the problem implicates can help eliminate some of the more 
subjective elements of moot-court judging. Many competitions already do 
much to bring substance to the forefront. For example, in most 
competitions, the brief score comprises up to 50% of an advocate’s overall 
score, and this often persists through final rounds of competition.246 As a 
general rule, brief scorers have no information about the name, sex, race, 
ethnicity, religion, or sexuality of the brief’s author.247 Often, the brief 
 246.  See A.B.A. NAT’L APPELLATE ADVOCACY COMPETITION RULES art. 11(3)(f)-(g) (2015), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/law_students/2015-
2016NAACRules.authcheckdam.pdf. [http://perma.cc/DF56-ZFBE] [hereinafter A.B.A. RULES]. See 
also JEFFREY G. MILLER NAT’L ENVTL. LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION OFFICIAL RULES r. 
V(B)(2) n.4 (2017), http://www.law.pace.edu/sites/default/files/NELMCC/2017_Official_Rules.pdf. 
[http://perma.cc/Q7MB-SEWA] [hereinafter PACE RULES]; NAT’L NATIVE AM. LAW STUDENTS 
ASS’N ANNUAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION OFFICIAL RULES Appendix A(4) (2015), 
http://media.wix.com/ugd/c50703_2f8f3c46d6b148a6b753eea0fb974ec4.pdf [http://perma.cc/BB2J-
5BVW] [hereinafter NALSA RULES]. 
 247.  See A.B.A. RULES, supra note 246, art. 11(1). See also PHILIP C. JESSUP INT’L LAW MOOT 
COURT COMPETITION OFFICIAL RULES r. 6.15 (2017), https://www.ilsa.org/
jessup/jessup17/2017%20Rules%20Final%20PDF.pdf. [http://perma.cc/X3GN-2KZX] [hereinafter 
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score affects initial pairings in oral argument rounds; much like the 
ranking system in the college basketball tournament, teams are seeded 
based on brief score, and then teams with higher brief scores compete 
against teams with lower brief scores in the initial oral-argument 
rounds.248 This makes it more difficult for a team with a flashy oral-
argument style but weak grasp of the substance to take advantage of an 
ill-prepared or superficial bench to vault over a more substantively strong 
team. 
Many competitions also use scoring rubrics to shift the focus from 
style to substance. Substantive issues—such as knowledge of the law, 
knowledge of the record, and responses to questions from the bench—
increasingly make up a larger percentage of the overall score, with 
categories like demeanor, speaking style, and courtroom presence 
receiving as little as 10% or 20% of the overall point total. The risk of 
rubrics, however, is that they may mask particularly pernicious bias; a 
judge may conscientiously believe that she is allocating points for 
knowledge of the law when, in fact, she is allocating points for how well 
she perceived a competitor to have communicated that knowledge, and 
that perception may be influenced by implicit bias. 
Competition administrators also can do more to encourage and 
enable judges to reward a strong substantive legal argument over a more 
superficially pleasing one. Many moot-court critics identify poor judging 
as the biggest obstacle to achieving the exercise’s pedagogical goals.249 
And the biggest obstacle to good judging may be poor preparation. Ill-
prepared judges who have only a superficial understanding of the legal 
and factual issues involved often “reward cleverness and poise over 
persuasiveness and sound argumentation.”250 Judges who are not 
thoroughly familiar with the record or the law either recognize that they 
cannot accurately assess the substantive arguments and therefore fall back 
on easy, canned comments about style or demeanor, or they risk being 
bamboozled by an advocate who delivers inaccurate or oversimplified 
legal arguments with confidence and panache.251 In fact, as much as 
possible, the best moot-court judges approach the moot argument as they 
would if they were real judges who needed to decide real legal 
JESSUP RULES]; PACE RULES, supra note 246, r. III(C); NALSA RULES, supra note 246, rs. 5.4(a), 
8.4(a). 
 248.  See A.B.A. RULES, supra note 246, art. 8(1)(c). See also JESSUP RULES, supra note 247, r. 
8; NALSA RULES, supra note 246, r. 9.8(a). 
 249.  See e.g., Barbara Kritchevsky, Judging: The Missing Piece of the Moot Court Puzzle, 37 
U. MEM. L. REV. 45 (2006); Vitiello, supra note 229; Kozinski, supra note 229. 
250.  Kritchevsky, supra note 249, at 49. 
251.  Id. at 48-49. 
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arguments.252 Although the moot-court judge should avoid scoring the 
advocates based on which side might win in a real case, the judge should 
focus on how much the advocate’s argument would assist a real court in 
arriving at a just decision rather than on whether an argument was 
delivered with flair or panache. 
Possibly the most important thing a competition administrator can do 
to encourage judges to focus on substance is to create a simple and 
achievable problem. Many who draft problems for moot-court 
competitions seem to strive to make them as complex and challenging as 
possible, introducing students (and judges) to labyrinthine statutory 
schemes, complicated interactions between different areas of law, and 
cutting-edge issues. Although, of course, a competition wants to present 
an intellectual challenge to students, and the problem should be interesting 
to both students and judges, the difficulty arises when judges—often busy 
attorneys and judges with little time to prepare, working from bench 
memos and case summaries—attempt to get their heads around these 
complex issues in a short period of time. This makes it difficult for those 
judges to distinguish between a glib but confident argument and a more 
nuanced and accurate presentation of the type that would be more likely 
to carry the day in a real appellate court. In creating problems and bench 
memos, then, competition administrators should focus on making the key 
legal and factual issues ones that busy lawyers and judges can quickly 
assimilate. 
Even relatively simple legal issues can involve dozens of lengthy 
cases that a student might cite, and often specialty competitions focused 
on niche areas of law have little choice but to delve into complex issues. 
Moreover, a problem that is too simple risks failing to engage both the 
students and the judges. Creating a closed-universe problem—that is, one 
where all the necessary sources of law are provided with the assigning 
materials—permits a competition to create an intellectually challenging 
problem while making it easier for the competition to prepare judges to 
accurately assess any cases students might cite or arguments students 
might assert. It deprives the students of all of the skill-building experience 
that conducting the research would provide, but that might be a small but 
necessary price to pay to improve the overall quality of judging. 
Even with a complex, open-universe problem, competition 
administrators can build better-prepared benches by providing exhaustive 
briefing and training before the competition. Yes, this will be time-
consuming, and yes, recruiting an adequate number of qualified judges is 
252.  Id. at 55-73. 
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challenging enough when they simply must attend a couple of hours of 
arguments and read a bench memo. That said, if you offer your judges a 
free, high-quality presentation on the legal issues involved in your moot-
court problem, and if you work with your state bar to offer those judges 
hours of Continuing Legal Education (CLE) credit for that session, you 
may find that you are actually able to recruit more judges and that those 
judges will be better prepared to assess and score the arguments and 
provide good, substantive feedback. Some states will permit you to offer 
CLE credit for judging the arguments themselves and even for some 
preparation time, which also helps busy attorneys justify devoting their 
time to the endeavor. Creating a webinar or other online course will make 
it even more convenient for your judges to access the content that you 
provide on their own time. 
This focus on substance over style does not mean, of course, that 
competition judges should not penalize competitors for communicating 
disrespect for the court through demeanor, word choice, or tone, or for 
using overly casual language or gratuitous slang or profanity in oral 
argument. But scoring rubrics and judge-training materials should provide 
clear and concrete examples of the kinds of conduct that should and 
should not result in point deductions in those categories. And scoring 
rubrics and judge-training materials should warn judges against letting 
superficial and inoffensive style and demeanor issues affect scoring in 
substantive areas. These materials also should strongly discourage judges 
from commenting on the physical appearance or dress of the advocates. 
Competition administrators can also help judges to avoid acting on 
implicit bias by making judges aware of their own biases. The judging 
memo or CLE materials can include a link to the Project Implicit website 
where judges can take the IAT, which identifies biases individuals often 
do not even realize they possess.253 Simply exposing them to the test and 
the website can make your judges more aware of the impact of implicit 
bias and the fact that even well-meaning people can harbor pernicious 
biases based on immutable traits like race or gender.254 A caution: do not 
try to use the IAT to pre-screen judges for bias. The test’s creators 
admonish that the IAT was not designed for that purpose, and using it for 
that purpose “could lead to undesired and unjustified consequences.”255 
 253.  PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit [http://perma.cc/R8GY-NBDB] 
(last visited Sept. 12, 2017). 
 254.  Overview, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/education.html 
[http://perma.cc/KW6R-EHYZ] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).  
 255.  Ethical Considerations, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/
ethics.html [http://perma.cc/N93A-NK3W] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017). 
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And, just like coaches and students, judges can be educated on 
mindset theory and stereotype threat and encouraged to deliver feedback 
that fosters a growth mindset and conveys belief in a student’s ability to 
meet high standards. You might include brief materials on the theories in 
your judging memo or CLE packet, and you can model how to frame 
feedback there, as well. 
Even with all of this planning and preparation, judges may behave 
badly. Judges may honestly disagree with the competition’s philosophy 
regarding comments on demeanor and appearance, or judges may be ill-
prepared or difficult. Competition organizers should develop systems to 
monitor judges—providing team coaches with comment cards is one good 
method—and counsel judges who make inappropriate comments. Should 
a judge remain intractable or display gross bias or prejudice toward a 
competitor because of an innate trait, the competition should not ask that 
judge to return. This can be difficult when a judge is a significant donor 
or a luminary within the legal community, so competition organizers 
should make sure that key stakeholders understand and buy into the 
competition’s philosophy regarding these issues. 
VII.CONCLUSION
Moot-court competitions, programs, and exercises present one of the 
first opportunities for law students to try on a professional identity and to 
contemplate what it means to look, sound, and act like a lawyer. As moot-
court educators, judges, competition directors, and board members, we 
have the opportunity and obligation to teach students that the voice of 
authority in the legal profession comes in a variety of pitches and physical 
packages. We need not discard the lessons of Classical rhetoric—although 
we may challenge a few—but we should deliver them with an 
acknowledgment of the context from which they arose, a context in which 
women’s voices were largely silenced, at least in the public sphere. This 
can only increase access to all aspects of the profession, not just for 
women but for members of all groups traditionally marginalized both in 
law school and in the legal profession. 
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